The recommended steps are:
* Taking nuclear forces off alert
* Removal of warheads from delivery vehicles
* Ending deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons
* Ending nuclear testing
* Initiating negotiations to further reduce US and Russian
nuclear arsenals
* Agreement among the nuclear weapon states of reciprocal no
first use undertakings, and of a non-use undertaking by them
in relation to the non-nuclear weapon states.
* Taking Nuclear Forces Off Alert
The continuing practice of maintaining nuclear-tipped missiles
on alert, whether on land-based or sea-based platforms, is a
highly regrettable perpetuation of Cold War attitudes and
assumptions. It needlessly sustains the risk of hair-trigger
postures. It retards the critical process of normalising
United States-Russian relations. It sends the unmistakable
and, from an arms control perspective, severely damaging
message that nuclear weapons serve a vital security role. It
is entirely inappropriate to the extraordinary transformation
in the international security environment achieved at such
staggering cost. Taking these missiles off alert is a natural
counterpart to the stand-down of bombers from nuclear alert
which was implemented in late 1991.
Terminating nuclear alert would reduce dramatically the chance
of an accidental or unauthorised nuclear weapons launch. It
would have a most positive influence on the political climate
among the nuclear weapon states and help set the stage for
intensified cooperation. Taking nuclear forces off alert could
be verified by national technical means and nuclear weapon
state inspection arrangements. In the first instance,
reductions in alert status could be adopted by the nuclear
weapon states unilaterally.
Removal of Warheads from Delivery Vehicles
The physical separation of warheads from delivery vehicles
would strongly reinforce the gains achieved by taking nuclear
forces off alert. This measure can be implemented to the
extent that nuclear forces can be reconstituted to an alert
posture only within known or agreed upon timeframes, much as
is the case with bomber forces today. Adequate response to
nuclear threats would remain certain, but the risk of large
scale preemptive or surprise nuclear attack and the imperative
for instantaneous retaliation would be obviated. Further, the
barriers against inadvertent or accidental use would be
greatly strengthened. The range of verification procedures
which are already in place between the United States and
Russia could likely be applied as the basis of a regime to
ensure that no state would have a meaningful advantage in
terms of the ability to reassemble its nuclear force for a
first strike capability.
Ending Deployment of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
The nuclear weapon states should unilaterally remove all
non-strategic nuclear weapons from deployed sites to a limited
number of secure storage facilities on their territory. This
would be a logical follow-on to the 1991 unilateral
declarations of the United States and the Soviet Union,
whereby each pledged to remove all non-strategic nuclear
weapons from ships and submarines and store them on shore. As
regards NATO, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and all
that has followed in its wake, the nuclear threat long felt by
the alliance has evaporated. United States tactical nuclear
weapons deployed in Western Europe serve no security purpose.
To the contrary, they send a subtle but unmistakable message
that Russia is still not to be trusted, thus feeding the fears
that NATO harbours aggressive designs against it. These
nuclear weapons can be returned to US territory and stored so
that, much like strategic forces removed from alert, they can
not be readily redeployed.
Ending Nuclear Testing
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty will be a major impediment
to the development of new generations of nuclear weapons by
the nuclear weapon states. It will perform an equally vital
non-proliferation function by inhibiting nuclear weapons
development by potential new nuclear weapon states, including
the undeclared nuclear weapon states and nuclear threshold
states. Most important, the CTBT obligation permanently to
cease or forgo nuclear testing sets the psychological stage
for moving toward elimination of nuclear weapons. Pending
universal application of the CTBT, all states should observe
at once the moratorium it imposes on nuclear testing.
Further US/Russian Bilateral Reductions
The nuclear arms race was driven by competition between the
United States and the former Soviet Union. The United States
and Russia must continue to show leadership in reversing the
nuclear accumulations of the Cold War. Their purpose should be
to move toward nuclear force levels for all the nuclear weapon
states which would reflect unambiguously the determination to
eliminate these weapons when this step can be verified with
adequate confidence.
The immediate steps discussed above deal with the manner in
which residual nuclear forces are deployed that diminish to
the greatest possible extent both the risk of inadvertent or
accidental use and the adverse political signals transmitted
by poised nuclear forces. With respect to the size of
arsenals, there are two notional targets. First, the United
States and Russia should, in consultation with the other
nuclear weapon states, establish the relative force levels
that would allow all five nuclear weapon states to proceed in
concert with reductions beyond that point. Second, the five
nuclear weapon states should agree on the minimum residual
forces to be retained until the stage had been set for
complete elimination.
The Commission considers it inappropriate to try and forecast
the stages involved in reaching these targets. Clearly, there
will have to be at least one further reduction agreement on
the part of the United States and Russia. It should be noted
in this context that the entry into force of the START II
agreement is in some doubt because Russia may be required to
invest in new nuclear weapon systems in order to reach parity.
To obviate this undesirable development, and to facilitate the
ratification of START II, lower ceilings could be promptly
negotiated in a START III agreement. President Yeltsin has
already proposed the figure of 2000 (compared with the 3000
- 3500 the agreement currently specifies) but lower
levels should be considered to hasten the achievement of force
levels that would bring all the nuclear weapon states into the
process.
Similarly, the Commission considers it presumptuous to try and
specify from its present vantage point the minimum residual
forces that the nuclear weapon states would regard as the
appropriate final way-station pending complete elimination. It
would observe, however, that the considerations that the
nuclear weapon states would bring to bear in determining this
level would be profoundly different from those that have
shaped these negotiations to this point.
While of signal importance, the existing START agreements do
not require that withdrawn warheads be disassembled and
destroyed. Hence actual stockpiles of warheads in the United
States and Russia post- START II are likely to be much higher
than the figures set by the agreement. Nor do the START
agreements address disposition of the fissile material content
of warheads removed from deployment. This material represents
the core element of a 'virtual arsenal' existing outside the
START framework, and which would be available to the United
States and Russia if ever a political decision were taken to
reassemble dismantled warheads.
This concern was mitigated in part by agreements reached at
the 10 May 1995 US/Russian summit to develop procedures for
ensuring that excess nuclear warheads are dismantled and the
reduction process made irreversible. The 1996 Moscow Nuclear
Safety and Security Summit also underscored a need to identify
appropriate strategies for the management of fissile material
designated as no longer required for defence purposes. The
summit undertook to convene by the end of 1996 an
international meeting of experts to examine available options
and identify possible development of international cooperation
in the implementation of national strategies. The knowledge
gained from implementation of these undertakings should prove
valuable for development of systems for verification of
warhead dismantlement and fissile material control. The
Commission considers arrangements for the control and
verification of the dismantlement to be essential for the
stability and sustainability of the process of reducing
nuclear weapons.
The security benefits of the START agreements and their value
as a staging point to wider nuclear disarmament would be
increased if START III or a separate agreement required the
verified dismantlement of warheads withdrawn under past and
future US/Russian bilateral reduction agreements, tactical
warheads withdrawn unilaterally and reserve warheads. This
would establish warhead numbers (strategic and tactical,
active and in reserve) as the basic unit of account in
US/Russian reductions and provide a common basis for
considering relative force levels when nuclear disarmament
moves beyond the bilateral phase.
Agreements on No First Use and on Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons
In the post-Cold War world the only conceivable residual role
of nuclear weapons is to pose a threat of retaliation against
nuclear aggression. It follows that a joint no-first use
undertaking would be at no strategic cost to the nuclear
weapon states. Indeed as a significant confidence building
measure it would in fact enhance their security.
As one of the immediate steps, the nuclear weapon states
should agree and state that they would not be the first to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against each other and that
they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in any
conflict with a non-nuclear weapon state. The Commission
considers that such an agreement should be brought into
operation as soon as possible.
Canberra Commission Report Continued
Proposition One