On the other hand, there are advantages to the proposal for a
comprehensive new treaty. The new treaty option may also allow
some distance from the disappointing implementation record of
Article VI and from acrimonious debate about the extent to
which the NPT is discriminatory. As to the risk that efforts
towards a new treaty may undermine the achievements of the NPT
without necessarily proving a better vehicle for disarmament,
one or two options suggest themselves as ways of minimising
that danger:
* The new treaty could provide that none of its provisions
were intended to affect the operation of the NPT until such
time as the new treaty had both entered into force and been
adhered to by every state party to the NPT. At that stage, the
NPT would be terminated, either explicitly by the terms of the
new treaty, to which all NPT parties had adhered, or
implicitly by virtue of Article 59 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties - assuming that the new treaty would
either subsume the NPT in its entirety or be incapable of
simultaneous application with it. However, this would be a
very elaborate solution, and confusion would be likely as to
the interaction between the provisions of the new treaty and
those of the NPT during the period before the NPT was
terminated
* The new treaty could provide that it was to enter into force
only after it had been ratified by all states party to the
NPT. Again, the NPT would at that stage be terminated, whether
explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the provisions of the NPT
would not be jeopardised prior to the clear-cut replacement of
the NPT regime with the regime ushered in by the entry into
force of the new treaty. The difficulty here is that such a
high threshold requirement for entry into force may mean that
the new treaty never did enter into force, so that despite all
the efforts towards a new treaty the practical outcome would
be the continuation of an unimproved NPT regime.
While universal adherence to a new treaty would be the goal,
no means exist to force all states to adhere to it. Even if it
were universally accepted that the possession of nuclear
weapons breached customary international law, states would not
be thereby obliged to accept the particular variant of
non-proliferation and verification commitments negotiated in
the new treaty. However, there is no legal difficulty in
formulating an absolute treaty prohibition on the development
and possession of nuclear or any other weapons, and in giving
such a prohibition binding force for the states parties.
Fundamental, in any reflection on the legal regime required as
a basic part of the architecture for a nuclear weapon free
world, is the recognition that the legal regime supports but
does not itself bring about such a world. Questions about what
the legal regime would comprise are important and do play a
role in the political negotiations through which a nuclear
weapon free world will be established. But it is these
negotiations and determination to make them effective which
are central to the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mandate
The Commission will develop ideas and proposals for a concrete
and realistic program to achieve a world totally free of
nuclear weapons. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is
widely recognised as having become the most serious threat to
global security, and member states of the United Nations and
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
have committed themselves to the objective of a world totally
free of nuclear weapons. While various studies relevant to the
achievement of such a world have been and are being conducted,
there has been no attempt to develop a comprehensive and
practical answer to the crucial question of how this objective
can be achieved.
The practical steps towards a nuclear weapon free world, to be
suggested by the Commission, will also address the related
problem of maintaining stability and security during the
transitional period and after the ultimate goal is
accomplished.
The Commission will present a report to the Prime Minister of
Australia by 31 August 1996. It is the Government of
Australia's intention to submit the Commission's report to the
51st Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and
to the Conference on Disarmament.
The Commission will consider and develop recommendations on
the following issues:
* Identification of concrete and realistic steps for achieving
a nuclear weapon free world, including the development and
establishment of necessary verification and control mechanisms
and new international legal obligations. Possible areas of
focus include:
-
* the contribution of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; nuclear
weapon free zones; a 'cut-off' convention on the cessation of
production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; a possible
treaty requiring all states to declare and account for their
present stocks of fissile material; and the strengthening of
the international safeguards system;
- * carrying through of the commitment by the nuclear weapon
states to eliminate their nuclear stockpiles through a
systematic process, including safe and secure arrangements for
weapons dismantlement and destruction; and
- * the problem of nuclear threshold states and the related
issue of achieving universal participation in the NPT.
* Development of durable security arrangements, both globally
and regionally, including:
- * the maintenance of a system of stable deterrence while the
reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is being
achieved;
- * the link with other weapons of mass destruction and their
control or elimination; and
- * measures to prevent break-out, nuclear theft and nuclear
terrorism/criminality.
* Other related issues the Commission may identify during its
work.
November 1995
Canberra Commission Report Continued
Proposition One