To the extent that the plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the regulations governing signs and camping in Lafayette Park, it is plain that their claims will fail. See
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e.g., Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 288 and White House Vigil, 746 F.2d 1518; Huddle v. Reagan, 1991 U.S. Deist. LEXIS 7070; Thomas v. United States, 696 F.Supp. 702. To the extent that the plaintiffs allege selective or arbitrary enforcement, their allegations fail to demonstrate anything more than that the regulations are being enforced. See Huddle at *29. As Judge Green noted in Huddle, "[e]ven if plaintiffs had pointed to scattered instances of misconduct, it is clear that plaintiffs are not entitled to relief." *26-*27 (footnote omitted). Thus, even accepting plaintiffs' allegations, they are entirely unlikely to prevail on the merits of their claims.
Moreover, as the attached letter from Randolph Myers demonstrates, far from arbitrarily enforcing the applicable regulations, the Park Police officers have correctly informed plaintiffs that they are in violation of certain regulations. This letter, describing the nature of the violations, further supports the Court's conclusion of January 6th that plaintiffs are unlikely to prevail on the merits of their claims.
2. Plaintiffs' Have Failed to Demonstrate
Immediate Irreparable Harm.
Although the plaintiffs make sweeping, conclusory allegations that their First Amendment rights are being trampled, they have failed to assert a factual foundation for these assertions. Plaintiffs' factual allegations boil down to claims that, over a period of several months (1) Park Police officers found that two flags, a large wooden free-standing sign and a cooler might violate the applicable regulations; (2)
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demonstrators who Park Police officers believe are violating the camping regulation have been awakened; and (3) several months ago one plaintiff was charged with disorderly conduct but was not ultimately prosecuted. These facts simply do not demonstrate the sort of immediate, irreparable harm that would justify the imposition of a temporary restraining order.
3. The Issuance of an Injunction Would
Be Adverse to the Public Interest
Finally, and most importantly, the issuance of the temporary restraining order sought by plaintiffs would be extremely harmful to the public interest. The regulations governing demonstration activities in Lafayette Park serve both to protect the security of the President and other occupants of the White House, and to preserve and protect the Park itself. The Court noted at the January 6th hearing the rash of incidents that have occurred in the last few months threatening the security of the President, ranging from the crash of a small plane on the White House lawn, to instances of gunfire at the White House. The public interest certainly requires that the Park Service be able to enforce regulations that have been upheld against constitutional challenge time and again. In the face of the plaintiffs' meager factual allegations, the public interest patently supports the denial of plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration or in the alternative to dismiss their complaint as frivolous should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
_____________________________
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., D.C. BAR #303115
United States Attorney
_____________________________
SALLY M. RIDER. D.C. BAR #436588
Assistant United States Attorney
OF COUNSEL:
RANDOLPH MYERS, Esq.
Office of the Solicitor
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