Requirements for Temporary Relief


Requirements for Temporary Relief

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF

In light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the plaintiffs have met the familiar standards for temporary relief set forth in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. PPC, 259 F.2d 921 (DC Cir. 1958) and WMATA v. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d 841 (DC Cir. (1977).

First, there is a likelihood that the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits of the Complaint. Even if it can be shown that the camping regulation had been passed directly from the Creator of the Universe to Officer O'Neill, and even assuming that Mr. Corniel was actually violating the camping regulation, if the evidence presented at trial establishes that Officer O'Neill kicked and struck Mr. Corniel with a police baton, in kicking and striking Mr. Corniel Officer O'Neill ignored due process, and committed the criminal act of "assault."

Second, if relief is not granted, plaintiffs will be irreparably injured in their efforts to exercise their freedom to communicate with the general public on issues of broad concern free from continuing random, capricious, unjustifiable regulatory re-interpretation and enforcement. If evidence at trial shows Officers O'Neill and Keness, acting under color of a C.F.R. regulation, threatened to arrest Plaintiffs Thomas and Picciotto for displaying signs, that complied with the applicable regulations, and flags, for which Plaintiffs had a valid Park Service permit; it is likely that Officers O'Neill and Keness will be found to have violated 42 USC 1985(3), be liable to money damages, [15] and raise serious questions about about the supervision of police agents


[15 See, Amended Complaint, filed January 6, 1995, Prayer for Relief, page 10.]

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vested with deadly force. Suppression of First Amendment exercise, "even for short periods," has been held to constitute "irreparable injury," Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976), and to merit "substantial money damages." City of Watseka v. Illinois Public Action Council, 796 F.2d 1559, Summarily Affirmed by the Supreme Court, slip opinion 86-631, January 27, 1987. "The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is ... one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes." Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 4 (1945); see also, United States v. Eichman 58 LW 4745 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1989); Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus 482 U.S. 203 (1986); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 US l3l (l96l); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 411 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 368 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615; United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 177; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, (1980); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Thornbill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).

Third, the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order will not harm the Defendants. "From time immemorial" parks have been recognized as "public forums." Hague v. C.I.O, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Even if national security, the personal safety of the President, first Family and the White House are not the purpose of life, or even the paramount concern of the human race on earth, they are certainly at the top of Defendants' list of professional concerns. Nonetheless, subsequent to the recent regretable incidents involving aircraft and firearms in the vicinity of

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the White House, Defendants' have contented their national security hysteria by posting three addition officers in Lafayette Park on a twenty-four hour basis. Defendants have a pool of six hundred officers from which to select those three.

To restrain officers O'Neill, Keness and X from duty in Lafayette will merely decrease the available pool to 597, a number Defendants can work with. Restraining these three officers from duty in the Park will simply ensure maintenance of the status quo by protecting Plaintiffs' Constitutionally protected messages (a activity which has produced no ill effects on the Government since at least as early as June 3, 1981) as well as the physical safety of anybody who happens to be in the Park when police misconduct might go berserk. Moreover, granting the relief Plaintiffs request would not even prevent Defendants from inflicting these same three officers on citizens in other public parks.

Fourth, the public interest is best served by requiring that law enforcement officers, armed with ever increasingly deadly force, are adequately supervised to insure that they don't run amok, and, animated by personal bias, fear, or whimsy, harass or, if it is "the least restrictive force necessary," ultimately take the life of any person whom the agent feels inclined to exercise an abuse of power upon, or maybe shoot an unintended bystander by accident.

Accordingly, on this _____ day of January, 1995, it is,

ORDERED, Plaintiffs' Motion for a TRO be, and hereby is, GRANTED, and it is further,

ORDERED, Defendants are hereby temporarily restrained from assigning Officers O'Neill, Keness, and X to Lafayette Park, and it is further,<

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ORDERED, Defendants shall not abuse their legal authority, or permit their subordinates to abuse their legal authority, under color of the regulation at 36 C.f.R. 9 et seq, or the D.C. disorderly conduct regulations, to the detriment of rights guaranteed to Plaintiffs by the First, Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments in particular, and the well-being of the human race in general.

__________________________
CHARLES R. RICHEY
United States District Court Judge

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