Judges Order 2/8/95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


     William Thomas, et. al.       |          C.A. No. 94-2742
           Plaintiffs pro se,      |          Judge Charles R. Richey
                                   |
               v.                  |
                                   |
     The United States, et. al.    |
           Defendants.             |

ORDER

The Court is in receipt of the "Joint Motion of Conception Picciotto and Ellen Thomas for Leave to File Out of Time Replies to the Documents Filed by Defendants on January 24, 1995."

In said Motion, the Plaintiffs represent that the Court's Orders of January 27, 1995 and February 1, 1995 "raise a serious question as to whether plaintiffs will be permitted to fully brief their position." Joint Motion for Leave to File, at 1, The Plaintiffs suggest that the Court has been "extraordinarily generous towards defendants" in granting extensions of time, while somehow failing to take the Plaintiffs' pleadings seriously. Joint Motion, at 4. At one point, the Plaintiffs go so far as to posit that an inadvertent reference to 1994 (versus 1995) in the Court's Order entered January 27, 1995 was not a "harmless typo" but, rather, "an ex post facto attempt to excLude plaintiffs' replies to defendants' apposition under the statute of limitations." Joint Motion, at 4 n.4.

The Court wishes to emphasize once again that every litigant's pleadings are considered by this Court only in the most serious


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possible way. In fact, in view of the Plaintiffs' pro se status, the Court in this case has made every attempt to accommodate the Plaintiffs as much as reasonably possible. As the Plaintiffs acknowledge, the Court has expedited the briefing schedule at the Plaintiffs' behest, Joint Motion at 2, while at the same time repeatedly excusing the Plaintiffs~ inability to meet pleading deadlines. Since January 6, 1995, the Plaintiffs have filed six motions seeking extensions of time. Not one of these has been denied. The Defendants, in contrast, have sought only one such extension. Thus, the Court observes that the Plaintiffs' suggestion that the Court has somehow favored the Defendants with "generous extensions is simply inaccurate.

In the instant Motion, the Plaintiffs seek an extension of time in which to file replies "to the documents filed by Defendants on January 24, 1995." Joint Motion, at 1. On January 23, 1995, the Defendants filed a "Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Plaintiffs' Application for a TRO or alternatively, to Dismiss the Complaint as Frivolous." According to the docket sheet, nothing further was filed by the Defendants on or about that date, so the Court can only assume that the Plaintiffs are referring to said Opposition. The Court observes that, by Order entered January 27, 1995, the Court granted the plaintiffs' request for an extension of time until January 30, 1995 in which to file a Reply to said Opposition. Thereafter, by Order entered February 1, 1995, the Court granted another request for an extension of time until February 2, 1995 in which to file


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the same document.

In their instant Motion for yet another extension of time, filed February 3, 1995, the Plaintiffs represent that said Replies are ready for filing, but suggest that the Court may find them superfluous, having predetermined its ruling on the issues raised by the Defendants. Joint Motion, at 7. In the interests of justice, the Court shall again grant the Plaintiffs Motion, and they may file their Reply on or before 4:00 p.m. on February 13, 1995. The Court wishes to take this opportunity, however, to advise the Plaintiffs to take care before suggesting that the Court is operating under some sort of bias for or against any party. While the Plaintiffs suppose that the Court "will be disinclined to grant leave for them to file their Replies out of time," the record supports just the opposite conclusion. Joint Motion, at 7.

The Court is also in receipt of "Plaintiffs' Motions for Clear Notice, and to Determine Whether Plaintiff William Thomas is Wasting Time." In said Motion, the Plaintiffs appear to request that the Court instruct its Deputy Clerk, Ms. Debra White,[l] to send the Plaintiffs copies of the Court's Orders by facsimile. The Court does not as a matter of course send copies of Orders to any litigant by facsimile, as it has neither the time nor the resources to do so. It appears as if the Court's Clerk did at one point fax the Plaintiffs "the final page (period) of the Court's three page Order" of January 11, 1995 which, according to the Plaintiffs,


[1 Throughout the instant Motion, the Plaintiffs refer to a "Ms. Woods ." The Court can only assume that the Plaintiffs intended to refer to the Court's Deputy Clerk, Ms. Debra White.]


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"left much to the imagination." Plaintiffs' Motion for Clear Notice, at 2 n.2. While the Plaintiffs suggest that the Court's Clerk somehow failed to accommodate the Plaintiffs properly, the Clerk was, in fact, extending a special courtesy which the Court does not, and shall not, extend to every litigant with respect to every Order it issues. Moreover, the Court obsenres that, upon receiving only part of a document by facsimile, it is obviously incumbent on that person to call the sender and inform him or her that the entire document was not received, as a problem may have occurred in the processing by fax. Thus, the Plaintiffs have shown no error whatsoever on the part of the Court's very able Deputy Clerk.

In addition, the Plaintiffs argue that under the "emergency circumstances" of the Court's Order of February 1, 1995, there is no reason why the Court "should have precluded Ms. [White] from faxing [the Plaintiffs] a copy of the Order." Id. at 2-3. Said Order simply granted one of them Plaintiffs' Motions for an Extension of Time, which was filed on January 30, 1995, and in which the Plaintiffs sought an extension for filing a pleading until January 31, 1995. In its February 1, 1995 Order, the Court granted the Plaintiffs an extension until February 2, 1995 in which to file the same, two days in addition to the Plaintiffs' request. In view of the timely ruling on said Motion and the Court ' s instructions to its Clerk that she telephone the contents of the same to the parties, no litigant can reasonably expect further accommodation from the Court and its staff. This is particularly


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so where, as here, the alleged "emergency circumstances" constitute a request for an extension of time by the very litigants who now inappropriately assert that the Court "may feel that, unlike the U.S. Attorney, the undersigned hasn't anything more pressing to do than bother this honorable Court with frivolous requests for extensions ." Id. at 3. Indeed, the Court has gone well beyond its normal practice with respect to the instant Plaintiffs, who apparently fail to appreciate that scores of other parties also have pressing needs which must compete for the Court's limited time and resources.

Accordingly, to the extent that the Plaintiffs request that the Court's Clerk send all Orders to the Plaintiffs by facsimile, and to the extent that the Plaintiffs request a hearing "to determine exactly how the [Plaintiffs'] might be wasting [the Court's] lsparel time," their Motion is denied. Id.

The Court is also in receipt of a "Joint Motion by Plaintiffs Conception Picciotto and Ellen Thomas for Rule 11 Sanctions." The Court shall deny the Plaintiffs' Motion at this time, without prejudice to the right of the Plaintiffs to renew the same after the Court has had an opportunity to consider the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto or, alternatively, at the end of the proceedings in this case.

The Plaintiffs have also filed a "Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 1, 1995 Order." As mentioned above, the Court in its Febwary 1, 1995 Order granted the Plaintiffs' "Second Motion for an Extension of Time Within Which to Reply to


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Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Reconsider Denial of the TRO, or Alternatively to Dismiss the Complaint as Frivolous, and Defendants' Motion for Stay of Discovery Pending Resolution of the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. " [2] As explained above, the Plaintiffs sought an extension until January 31, 1995 in which to file said Reply, and the Court granted an extension until February 2, 1995. In an Order entered January 27, 1995, the Court granted the Plaintiffs "Motion for Leave to File Out of Time Plaintiffs' Response to the United States' Motion to Dismiss," affording the Plaintiffs until February 3, 1995 to file said Opposition, and directing the Defendants to file any Reply thereto on or before February 9, 1995. In their instant Motion, the Plaintiffs take "strong exception" to the Court's requiring them to Reply to one Motion by February 2, 1995, while allowing the Defendants to file a Reply to another Motion by February 9, 1995.

Both Orders, however, were in response to the Plaintiffs" requests for extensions of time. Apparently, the Plaintiffs are complaining that the Court failed to understand that their Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions, filed January 24, 1995, constituted their Opposition to the Defendant s Motion to Dismiss, and instead granted the Plaintiffs and, necessarily, the Defendants, more time to file their respective Opposition and Reply. The Plaintiffs argue that "[a] semblance of impartiality would be better portrayed


[2 The Plaintiffs take issue with the Court's ruling on the Defendants' "Motion for Stay of Discovery Pending Resolution of the Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss." The Court will, of course, entertain any Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's Order of January 27, 1995 which addressed said Motion.]


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if the Court reconsidered its Order of February 1, 1995 and ORDERED both parties to file whatever Replies, Oppositions, or Motions they like (consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of course) by 4:00 p.m. February 9, 1995 . " Motion for Reconsideration, at 4. This request is extreme. The record reveals that, while the Plaintiffs have repeatedly sought extensions of time and received even more generous extensions than those requested, they now complain that the extensions granted were improper and impartial. They also complain that, rather than assuming that a Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions was to be treated as an Opposition to a Motion to Dismiss, the Court improperly granted the Plaintiffs more time to file yet another pleading in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court is, in short, losing its patience with the Plaintiffs. The Motion shall be denied to the extent that it seeks reconsideration of the Court's Order of February 1, 1995. As indicated above, however, the Court shall grant the Plaintiffs' instant "Motion for Leave to File Out of Time Replies to the Documents Filed by Defendants on January 24, 1995," such that the Plaintiffs shall have until February 13, 1995 to file the Reply in question anyway.

The Court is also in receipt of "Plaintiff William Thomas' Motion to Withdraw his Motion to Dismiss for Frivolity," in which he renews his request that the Court recuse itself from this case, That request shall be denied. The Plaintiff also seeks to clarify his request that the case be dismissed for frivolity as an alternative to the Court's reconsideration of its denial


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of their application for a TRO:sua sponte

[I]f the Court is thinking about signing a sua sponte Order to Dismiss for Frivolity,
I have no problem (beyond a deeply held compassionate concern for the Court's Immortal
Soul), and will promptly file an appeal. However, unless this Court honorably represents
the dismissal as sua sponte, as opposed to merely GRANTING plaintiff Thomas' Motion to
Dismiss his own complaint, thereby possibly throwing a monkey wrench in the appellate
review PROCESS, I hereby move to withdraw my Mstion to Dismiss for Frivolity.
Motion to Withdraw, at 4.

Thus the Plaintiff appears to be requesting that, if the Court grants the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Frivolity (styled as a "Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Plaintiffs' Application for a TRO or alternatively, to Dismiss the Complaint as Frivolous"), it must make clear that the Court is taking such action sua sponte, and not upon the Plaintiff's Motion. As such a ruling would be a contradiction in terms, and as the Court has no intention of dismissing this case sua sponte as it does not view the matter as frivolous, the Motion shall be granted.

Accordingly it is, by the Court, this 8th day of February, 1995,

ORDERED that the "Joint Motion of Conception Picciotto and Ellen Thomas for Leave to File Out of Time Replies to the Documents Filed by Defendants on January 24, 1995" shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED, as hereinafter provided; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs shall have until 4:00 p.m. on February 13, 1995 in which to file a Reply to the Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of Denial


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of Plaintiffs' Application for a TRO or alternatively, to Dismiss the Complaint as Frivolous; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the "Plaintiffs' Motions for Clear Notice , and to Determine Whether Plaintiff William Thomas is Wasting Time" shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the "Joint Motion by Plaintiffs Conception Picciotto and Ellen Thomas for Rule 11 Sanctions" shall be, and hereby is, DENIED, without prejudice to the right of the Plaintiffs to renew the same after the Court has had an opportunity to consider the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs' Opposition thereto or, alternatively, at the end of the proceedings in this case; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' "Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's February 1, 1995 Order" shall be, and hereby is, DENIED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that "Plaintiff William Thomas' Motion to Withdraw his Motion to Dismiss for Frivolity" shall be, and hereby is, GRANTED, such that the Plaintiffs' "Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Plaintiffs' Application for a TRO or alternatively, to Dismiss the Complaint as Frivolous" [12-1] shall be treated solely as a Motion for Reconsideration of Denial of Plaintiffs' Application for a TRO.



_________________________________
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE