The Court will not grant a Motion for Reconsideration of a
judgment after its entry as a matter of course. "The primary
reasons for reconsideration of judgment are 'an intervening change
of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."' National
Trust v. Department of State, 834 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D.D.C. 1993)
(quoting Virgin Atlantic Airways. Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd.,
956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 s. ct. 67 (1992)),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Sheridan
Kalorama Historical Ass'n v. Christopher, 49 F.3d 750 (D.C. Cir.
1995) . "A Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an
opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has
already ruled." New York v, United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38
(D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam). Nor are "Rule 59(e) rnotions
vehicles for bringing before the court theories or arguments that
were not advanced earlier." Natural Resources Defense Council.
Inc. v United States Environmental Protection Agency, 705 F. Supp.
698, 701 (D.D.C.), vacated on other grounds, 707 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C.
1989).
2
The Plaintiffs' arguments in support of their Motion for
Reconsideration challenge the Court's holding that the Defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tbe Plaintiffs
contend that the Court's Opinion evidences "misunderstanding" of
the Plaintiffs' allegations in this case. Plaintiffs' Motion for
Reconsideration at 1. Principally, the Plaintiffs argue that
permits that they received from the Park Service authorize them to
display their signs and flags in Lafayette Park in such a way as to
exceed the height restrictions set forth in the governing Park
Service Regulations, 37 C.F.R. § 7.96 et seq. Also, they allege
that the Defendants "pursued a pattern and practice 'designed to
chill, disrupt or terminate the exercise of plaintiffs'
constitutionally-protected expressive religious activities." Id.
at 4.
The Court has carefully studied the Plaintiffs' Motion and
arguments in support thereof; however, the Court observes that the
Plaintiffs have merely reiterated argurnents already made
throughout the voluminous pleadings in this case. Before the Court
granted summary judgment for the Defendants in its August 23, 1995
decision, the Court understood and carefully considered the
Plaintiffs' arguments, but ultimately rejected them in reaching its
decision. In the interests of finality, the Court will not
3
entertain these same arguments again. See New York, 880 F. Supp.
at 38. Moreover, the Plaintiffs have not pointed out an
intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest
injustice such that would justify the Court's reconsideration of
its August 23, 1995 decision. See National Trust, 834 F. Supp. at
455. The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed
to set forth any grounds to warrant reconsideration of its August
23, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order.
Since the Plaintiffs rely on their religious convictions as
another basis for their Motion for Reconsideration, the Court has
decided to attach its Opinion and that of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the case of
United States v. Galindez, of which the Thomases were a part.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall deny the
Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 23,
1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court shall issue an Order
4
of even date herewith consistent with the foregoing Memorandum
Opinion.
September 12, 1995
(signed)
CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE