William Thomas, et. al. | C.A. No. 94-2742 Plaintiffs pro se, | Judge Charles R. Richey | v. | | The United States, et. al. | Defendants. |
this matter, that the reasons the Court has given for setting a hearing date five days after the relief to which they may have been entitled would have expired are inadequate, and raise a reasonable question as to a "degree of favoritism or antogonism as to make fair judgment impossible." Liteky, et. al. v. United States, 92-6921 (Decided
March 7, 1994), 54 Crl 2182, 2185.
"(O)pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks ... even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so i they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antogonism as to make fair judgment impossible." Liteky, at 2185.
provides the U.S. Marshal's Service must serve in forma pauperis process. Unless the Court's decision to deny an emergency hearing under the pretext that "defendants have not yet been served" suggests judicial incompetence, the reason for the Court to mention "service of process" raises a reasonable question as to a prejudicial desire to delay justice.
religious beliefs,[4] but even if it had that would not constitute grounds for the Court to apply that "official prejudice, which is perfectly all right" (Liteky, id.) to justify the favoritism for defendants indicated by the court's reluctance to conduct even a prefunctionary factual inquiry, before denying plaintiffs' application "without prejudice."
"If, for instance, a judge presiding over a retrial should state, based upon facts adduced and opinions formed during the original cause, an intent to ensure that one side or the other shall prevail, there can be little doubt that he or she must recuse. Cf. Rugenstein v. Ottenheimer 78 Ore. 371, 372, 152 P. 215, 218."