UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants Opposition to ..Rule 11 Sanctions
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
William Thomas, et. al. | C.A. No. 94-2742
Plaintiffs pro se, | Judge Charles R. Richey
The United States, et. al. |
PLAINTIFFS' REPLY TO DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
February 14, 1995 Defendants' Reply Memorandum of Points and Authorities ,,, in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion ... for Sanctions" ("Defts' Reply") was filed.
Unlike plaintiffs, defendants were brief:
"D. The Plaintiffs' Motions for Sanctions Should Be Denied.
"The Court has previously denied the plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions,
without prejudice to plaintiffs' right to renew the motion after the Court decides
the defendants' pending motion to dismiss. See January 27, 1995, Order. The
plaintiffs' repeated motions for sanctions are meritless. The defendants
have properly raised both the heightened pleading standard and qualified
immunity to defeat plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants.
The plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate any violation of Rule 11, Fed.R.Civ.P.,
and their motions should be denied with prejudice."
Although defendants were brief, they were less than fully responsive.
Plaintiffs have filed three Motions for Sanctions:
(Plaintiffs' [First] Motion for Sanctions, January 24, 1995;
Plaintiffs' [Second] Motion for Sanctions, February 2, 1995;
Plaintiffs' [Third] Motion for Sanctions, February 13 1995").
As indicated by the three previous Motions for Sanctions
plaintiffs assert that defendants have consistantly relied upon arguments that are "(1) not well grounded in fact, (2) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument ... or (3) (have been) interposed for any improper purpose." Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168, 1174.
Plaintiffs have asserted specific points in defendants pleadings.
Defendants have not even bothered to acknowledge the issues raised in the Motions for Sanctions, regarding Mr. Meyers' letter, nor have they acknowledged the jurisdiction of 42 USC 1986 as it should apply to Mr. Robbins.
Now, because, "the Court has previously denied (sua sponte) the plaintiffs' first motion for sanctions, without" even requiring defendants to note the existence of, much less answer any of the point raised plaintiffs' First Motion for Sanctions, the Government apparently feels it is simply not required to answer plaintiffs points.
"The law of evidence presupposes that in judging the claims of the litigants,
it is important to discern the true state of affairs underlying the dispute."
McCormick on Evidence, 3rd Edition (4th reprint, 1991), page 540. See also Fed. R.
Evid. 611 (a); see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068, 13
L.Ed.d 923 (1965); Fed. R. Evid. 406 (b), Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. at 692,
51 S.Ct. at 219.
Plaintiffs submit it would be a mistake if defendants were permitted to continue ignoring the points plaintiffs raise in oppostion to the the points defendants contend proceeding to argue this case as if Mr. Robbins were not subject to the jurisdiction of 42 USC 1985(3) or 1986, and as if Mr. Meyers'
letter of January 20, 1995 was proof that plaintiffs had violated regulations in November, 1994.
Thus the Court should convene a hearing to determine whether sanctions should be imposed.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of February, 1995
2817 11th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby state that, on February 27, 1995, I delivered a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions upon the office of the United States Attorney, 555 4th Street NW Plaintiffs' Reply to Ddefendants' Opposition Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, Washington, D.C. ROOM 10-808, by placing it in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid.