Martin v. D.C. Metropolitan police Dept., 812 F.2d 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1987), and discarded the rule that obliged Bivens plaintiffs to plead direct evidence of unconstitutional motive. The Court's ruling in Crawford-El addressed the question of the proper standard applicable to claims against government officials "where the [alleged] unconstitutionality of the official's act turns on his motive," 93 F.3d at 815.
unreasonable," and "in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the conduct in question] must be apparent"). See also Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
stated a violation of an established right, which the District Court properly concluded that they had not. Memorandum Opinion at 7-11. The Court concluded that the Park Service regulations at issue did not protect the forms of expression chosen by appellants, and that the officers did not abuse their authority in their attempts to enforce those regulations.
Jones On Evidence: Civil and Criminal § 3:10 (7th ed. 1992) (other citations and internal quotations omitted). In this case, that standard requires that appellants do far more than allege unconstitutional motive; rather, they must, at the summary disposition stage, present evidence upon which a trier of fact could have a " firm belief or conviction" that their claim of unlawful motive is true. Id. Applying that standard to the facts of this case, appellants' evidence was woefully inadequate.
failed to state a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Moreover, even applying the proof standards announced in Crawford-El, dismissal of this action was correct since the record lacks any clear and convincing evidence of unconstitutional motive. Therefore, the judgment of the District Court should be summarily affirmed.
KIMBERLY N. TARVER
Assistant United States Attorney
Judiciary Center Building
555 4th Street, l0th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20001