1528 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
events in Oklahoma City, the restrictions of the streets proximate to the White House Complex compelled a similar and rational need to prevent access to vehicles attempting to cross through the Park to approach the White House Complex.
A. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Challenge Such Action.
in Lafayette Park. Amended Complaint at 2. He does not allege that the May 20th action has forced him to move from his location in Lafayette Park or that the action has prohibited people from coming into the Park to hear his message. He does not allege that serious environmental impacts, if any, will be overlooked as the federal government considers the future of this area; on the contrary, he alleges that an Environmental Impact Statement is scheduled to be performed during this process. Amended Complaint ¶ 13 & Exh. 1. Finally, plaintiff does not allege, nor can he show, any environmental consequences that may follow the street restrictions on May 20th.
activities," thereby violating his, and the public's, rights under the First Amendment. Amended Complaint at 8-9.
in a closed portion of Pennsylvania Avenue, in violation of 24 D.C.M.R. 100.1` 5./ and then refused to heed a D.C. Officer's order D.C.M.R. 100.1to remove it. Thus, plaintiff was not arrested because he sought to engage in First Amendment protected speech in Pennsylvania Avenue, but because his sign was occupying public space without a permit. Id.; Exh. A at 31.
(1985). Consequently, the government may in appropriate circumstances place reasonable restrictions on the time, place or manner of protected speech, so long as ample alternative means of communication are left open. see also, e.g,, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48; CCNV v. Kerrigan, 865 F.2d 382, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
The D.C. Ordinance prohibiting the placement of obstacles in public streets such as Pennsylvania Avenue easily satisfies Clark's three-part test for determining the constitutionality of time, place, or manner regulations. The Ordinance clearly does not regulate speech based upon its content or message; rather, the Ordinance imposes impartial rules that apply to all persons seeking to engage in demonstrations or special events, whatever the content of their message. The Ordinance is clear and precise, plainly not "open to the kind of arbitrary application that [the Supreme Court] has condemned as inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place and manner regulation . . . ." Heffron 452 U.S. at 649; Ward, 491 U.S. at 793-96. The Ordinance is also "narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest." The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has repeatedly recognized that safety, pedestrian and traffic flow are legitimate governmental interests justifying narrowly tailored restrictions on speech, See, e.g., Juluke v. Hodel, 811 F.2d 1553, 1560 (D.C. Cir. 1987); White House Vigil for the ERA v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
and placing an obstruction in the street. As Officer Radzilowski testified, plaintiff could walk in Pennsylvania Avenue carrying a sign, but the structure he placed in the street required two individuals to pull it there, and thus he was occupying space in violation of 24 D.C.M.R. 100.1. Exh. A at 33. Moreover, although the roadway is closed to general public vehicular traffic, it is still intended for use by, for example, police vehicles, fire trucks, emergency vehicles and motorcades. Id. at 36. Having individuals in the roadway with obstructions such as plaintiff's would require a longer time period to clear the roadway in the event of an emergency, id. at 39, thereby obviously interfering with the ability of appropriate individuals to respond to an emergency in the area. Thus, the D,C. Ordinance is "narrowly tailored" to serve the substantial government interest in maintaining Pennsylvania Avenue open for emergency responses and other official events.
petitions, and appeal to passersby." White House Vigil, 746 F.2d at 1528. The availability of such alternative channels of communication amply satisfy First Amendment concerns with respect to time, place, and manner limitations. Id.