Judges Memorandum Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA


     William Thomas, et. al.       |          C.A. No. 95-1018
           Plaintiffs pro se,      |          Judge Charles R. Richey
                                   |
               v.                  |
                                   |
     The United States, et. al.    |
           Defendants.             |

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF CHARLES R. RICHEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the Plaintiff's post-judgment Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 31, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in the above-captioned case. The Opinion and Order also declared moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Notice of Exhibits and denied the Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation of the above-captioned case with a case filed previously by the Plaintiff. For the reasons detailed herein, the Court shall deny the Plaintiff' s instant Motion for Reconsideration.

DISCUSSION

The Court will not routinely grant a Motion for Reconsideration of a judgment after its entry. "The primary reasons for reconsideration of judgment are 'an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.'" National Trust v. Department of State, 834 F. Supp. 453, 455 (D.D.C. 1993) (quoting Virgin Atlantic Airways. Ltd. v. National Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 67 (1992)), aff'd in nart and rev'd in part on other srounds sub nom. Sheridan Kalorama Historical Ass'n v. Christopher, 49 F.3d 750 (D.C. Cir. 1995) . "A Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider is not simply an opportunity to reargue facts and theories upon which a court has already ruled." New York v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 37, 38 (D.D.C. 1995) (per curiam). Nor are "Rule 59(e) motions vehicles for bringing before the court theories or arguments that were not advanced earlier." Natural Resources Defense Council. Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 705 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D.D.C.), vacated on other srounds, 707 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1989)

The Court's August 31, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all sixteen

Counts of the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. A number of those Counts challenged the action of the Federal Defendants in restricting public vehicular traffic from portions of streets around the White House complex and also challenged an alleged plan by the Federal Defendants to enclose Lafayette Park with permanent barriers or to close or diminish access to the Park in some manner unspecified by the Plaintiff. In its August 31, 1995 Decision, the Court held that the Plaintiff lacked standing to bring suit against the Federal Defendants for these actions because, although the Plaintiff has alleged generalized grievances with respect to these actions, he has not alleged any concrete and particularized injury to himself that was actual or is imminent and is not conjectural or hypothetical.

The remaining Counts in the Plaintiff's Amended Complaint challenged the action of the District of Columbia Defendants in arresting the Plaintiff for placing a structure having a sign and a seat on the 1600 block of Pennsylvania Avenue and refusing to remove that structure. The Court concluded that the Plaintiff's rights were not violated thereby. Thus, the Court held in favor of the Defendants on all Counts of the Amended Complaint.

In the instant Motion for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff challenges the Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the

Defendants. The Plaintiff asserts that "the Court doesn't understand the environment [sic] impact on democracy that would accrue from transforming Lafayette Square into Red, or Tiennamen Square , neither of which are surrounded by barri c ade s . " Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration at 2. The Court recognizes that the Plaintiff has expressed his serious concerns about the future of democracy; however, the Plaintiff's belief that the Defendants' conduct will somehow impact democracy does not allege a concrete and immediate injury to the Plaintiff himself sufficient to confer standing.

According to the Plaintiff, the Court's Opinion stands for the proposition that government officials "are free to do whatever they like." Id, at 4. On the contrary, the Court does not hold that the government is unaccountable for the action of its officials; rather, government action certainly may be challenged. However, in order for a federal court to entertain such a challenge, the party seeking to invoke the court's power must demonstrate that he or she has the requisite standing to do so. Particularized injury to that party is a necessary component of such standing. See United States v. Hays, No. 94-558, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 29, 1995)

The Court's August 31, 1995 Order also declared moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Notice of Exhibits. In his Motion

for Reconsideration, the Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of a videotape exhibit submitted in support of the Plaintiff's Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment. According to the Plaintiff, the videotape depicts "TV news and commentaries about the closure of Pennsylvania Avenue, documenting Secret Service actions, and the agency's contention that its mandate empowered it to transcend 'local and federal law' [;] the barriers blocking Pennsylvania Avenue and H Street , and surrounding Laf ayette Park [; the ] plaintiff' s demonstration and arrest [; and] two other recent demonstrations on the same site, on Pennsylvania Avenue." Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Notice of Exhibits at n.l.

Rule 201(b) provides for judicial notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute. The Plaintiff requests that the Court take judicial notice of a videotape depicting certain events but has not identified a specific "fact" therein to be judicially noticed. Moreover, the Court assures the Plaintiff that it has considered carefully the videotape exhibit, along with all of the Plaintiff's submissions in the instant case. The Court has observed that the videotape' s contents are consistent with the undisputed facts relevant to the Court's grant of summary judgment. Nothing in the tape would alter the Court's grant of summary judgment for the

Defendants. Therefore, the Court can see no purpose in taking judicial notice of the tape itself and reaffirms its decision to declare moot the Plaintiff's Motion for Judicial Notice.

Finally, the Court 's August 31, 1995 Decision denied the Plaintiff's Motion to Consolidate the present action with one filed previously by the Plaintiff. The Court hereby reaffirms its decision to deny the Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation for the reasons elaborated in its August 31, 1995 Memorandum Opinion.

The Plaintiff has not pointed out an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice such that would justify the Court's reconsideration of its August 31, 1995 Decision. See National Trust, 834 F. Supp. at 455. The Court therefore concludes that the Plaintiffs have failed to set forth any grounds to warrant reconsideration of its August 31 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall deny the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's August 31, 1995 Memorandum Opinion and Order. The Court shall issue an Order

_______________________

CHARLES R. RICHEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE