TIME LINE

i) SOME NON-CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS
OF RESPONDENTS' COMMON PLAN

The District Court held that, "(e)xcept for isolated instances of misconduct ... plaintiffs have failed to support their conclusory allegations of conspiracy." App. p. 30.

In contrast, prior to his "without prejudice" dismissal, Judge Oberdorfer held,

The camping regulation was ostensibly intended to address the specific of "demonstrators ... sleep(ing) in tents." Clark v. CCNV, 468 U.S. 288. Respondents agreed that "overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive conduct." Id. 299. Earlier, in the Circuit Court, respondents had stated a specific distinction between the "protected" and the "criminal."

Despite those representations to the court, on June 17, 1981 Respondent Robbins, in concert with others, suspended the delay of effectiveness (Fed. Reg., June 4, 1982, Vol. 47, No. 108, p. 24302) required by 5 USC 553(d), and enforced the regulation, without probable cause, against Petitioner Picciotto -- who had neither tents nor shelter, or structures, and who wasn't even sleeping. Record, Docket # 11, para. 13.

The "camping" regulation "furnished a convenient tool for harsh, discriminatory enforcement" (infra, p, 23, 35, 46-47, 57- 60) and the "unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation." Thomas II at 709, citing Kollander v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 360 (1982). But, as the Record suggests, not harsh enough to fully satisfy respondents' desire to suppress petitioners' expression.

After the "camping" regulation and their concerted efforts under color of D.C. regulations failed to dislodge petitioners from Lafayette Park, respondents began fashioning another regulatory scheme in pursuit of the same objective, strengthening the logical inference that in respondents' minds they were pursuing an ongoing plan.

It is certainly conceivable that when Respondent Robbins met with Mr. Watt in March, 1983 (infra, A MEETING OF MINDS TO ILLUSTRATE THE "ONGOING CONFLICT, p. 28). Mr. Robbins informed Mr. Watt that it would be unconstitutional to prohibit demonstrations outright (see, App. ps. 162, 163), therefore Robbins and Watt agreed to subvert the Constitution, "on an incremental basis" (Thomas II, at 705), through regulatory subterfuge.

Whether the connection, in respondents' minds, between Clark v. CCNV and White House Vigil v. Clark was malicious, is a very important, unanswered question.

Thus, the CCNV/Clark/White House Vigil connection remained unresolved when the Circuit Court concluded, "the issue for decision is not factual, it is legal" (White House Vigil, 476 F.2d 1518, 1528, 1529), and the District Court is mistaken when it relies on White House Vigil to foreclose judicial review of the broader instant Complaint. Huddle Memo, p. 20.

Without checks or balance to restrain them, respondents persisted in pursuing the same objective, fabricating a "Current Situation in Lafayette Park" (Fed. Reg., April 22, 1983, Vol 48, No. 79 p. 17352. Record, e.g., Docket # 45, Exhibit 68) to justify harsher unrestrained regulatory power aimed at:

On April 27, 1983, after respondents suspended the delay of effectiveness of their April 22nd rulemaking (without "good cause," see, App. ps. 150, 151), Petitioner William Thomas was promptly arrested without probable cause, Docket # 1, para. 39.

Respondents' preoccupation with the same objective is evident in their description of another purported "Current Situation in Lafayette Park":

Respondents never disputed that signs or daily "occupation" (supra, ftn. 11) of the White House sidewalk are constitutionally protected; instead, echoing the intent of Mr. Watt's memorandum of January 13, 1983 (App. p. 178), they merely pointed

Although it is settled that "(o)ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it can be exercised in some other place" (Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)), respondents manipulated the facts (infra, p. 28-31, 47) until the Circuit Court agreed that the alternative across the street was sufficient. White House Vigil at 1528.

In 1985 respondents, apparently still not satisfied that "demonstrations and protests" had been sufficiently prohibited, portrayed yet another aspect of a constantly shifting, euphemistic "Current Situation in Lafayette Park," where,

In still another "Current Situation in Lafayette Park, respondents' continued interest in the "Thomas Vigil" was again obliquely expressed by reference to "a few demonstrators who physically occupy ... space in the Park with signs." Fed. Reg., March 5, 1986, Vol. 51, No. 43, p. 7557, Docket # 131.

By this juncture of their ongoing onslaught against demonstrations in a "unique public forum," respondents, with the assistance of the U.S. Attorney's Office, had achieved a level of judicial tolerance which enabled them to summarily exonerate themselves of any appearance of wrongdoing by merely publishing a one paragraph summation of an "investigation" in the Federal Register. Id.

Because petitioners have never succeeded in securing a hearing, respondents were able to transform a 1700-odd page collection of paper into an unnecessary, injurious regulation (infra, A MEETING OF MINDS IN FURTHERANCE OF THE MAIN CONSPIRACY, p. 32-34.) regulation without any direct judicial inquiry. The "Thomas Vigil" endured, so respondents continued their concerted attack on the "Current Situation in Lafayette Park,"

The Federal Register publication of October 4, 1990 was also at issue in this Complaint. Infra, p. 42-43,

    • It is this joint regulatory progression, which has eluded judicial attention, and whittled away enough of the First Amendment to provide respondents with enough latitude to wage their "ongoing conflict."