A. Because:

1) It is common knowledge that plea bargainning is an "acceptable practice" within the judicial system of this nation, valid because the "Justice Department" has charged the defendant in a manner similar to that employed when it wishes to induce "dope pushers" to "cop a plea,"

2) because defendant Thomas is not particularly happy about the fact that he is in this country,

3) he would be perfectly happy to enter a plea of NO CONTEST, but only with the understanding that this Court would sentence him to be exiled.

B. This plea may not be as preposterous as it may seem on its face, particularly if the Court were to consider

a) it would resolve the "substantial governmnent interest" of removing the defendant from Lafayette Park.

b) Should defendant be imprisoned, such "punishment" would be less cruel and unusual.......in the respect that his "living accommodations" would then include shelter, heat, toilet facilities, storage of personal property, as well as on-site cooking, and laundry services.......... than the existence which he lives, in what the Government alleges to be in the instant matter, "accommodations" (i.e. the sidewalk of Pennsylvania Avenue).

c) Additionally, by imprisoning the defendant, an individual motivated by principles of conscience to participate in the activity of maintaining a vigil, on the grounds of criminal camping," would cause the government's arguments with respect to nuclear weapons madness in the defense of "freedom" to seem even more preposterous than they do on their face.

C. This Court has jurisdiction to issue such an order whereas:


1. The Government of the United Kingdom acted illegally in transporting the defendant to the United States. (See Attachment)

2. Representatives of the United States government acted illegally in forcing the defendant into the United States.

3. By virtue of the United Nations UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, to which the United States is a signatory. (See Philartica v Penablanca, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).)

Therefore defendant Thomas moves this Court to accept his plea of NO CONTEST in exchange for an Court order directing defendant's removal from this country.



A. COMMUNITY FOH CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v WATT D.C. Civil Action No. 82-02501, March 9, 1983 has been cited as a precedent in other cases in which defendants have been charged under Sec 50.27(a), always over defendant Thomas' objections. although many arguments advanced by the Government in CCNV v WATT strengthen the fibre of the Defense arguments in the instant matter, defendant Thomas contends,

1. CCNV addressed the hypothetical issues of permitted demonstrations by a group, and sleeping in tents,

2. the instant matter addresses the gut issues of individuals demonstrating under the permit exemption, 36 CFR 50.19 (1)(b) and allegedly sleeping without shelters,

3. Therefore, while the Defense would argue that no modern precedent exists with regard to the instant activities of the defendant, that more appropriately, UNITED STATES v ABNEY, 534 Fd2 298 (D.C. Cir. 1978)( should be the controlling precedent under existing law rather than CCNV

B. The framers of Sec 50.27(a) attempt to rationalize ABNEY into legal limbo by unabashedly stating: "The court explicitly stated that an across-the-board ban on sleeping outside campgrounds might well be Constitutionally acceptable if duly promulgated and


even-handedly " [1] Not only does the analysis of these regulations specify that certain kinds of sleep are unaffected by the regulation, which causes the ban on "sleeping" to be less than across-the-board, but additionally the Defense maintains that enforcement of the regulation has been considerably less than even-handed.

In light of 36 CFR 50.27(a)(l) [2] in which the Government clearly defines "holding vigils" as a form of conduct which (involves) the communication of expression of views or grievances, [3] it would appear to be obvious that a vigil in and of itself is recognized by the Government as symbolic speech.

[1. An examination of the context in which these words were used might appear to indicate that the Park Service deals with demonstrators like Abney in an underhanded manner.
"Abney, through his attorney, applied for a permit under Sec. 50.25(k). three days before the first arrest at issue here. Not until 19 days later did he receive a reply denying the permit (Footnote: This 19-day delay runs afoul of principles announced in A QUAKER ACTION GROUP v MORTON, 170 U.S. App D.C. 124, 142 516 F2d 717, 735 1975), in a letter from the Director of the National Capital Parks....not from the Superintendent, who is the official designated in the regulation to pass on such requests. The letter indicated that such permission is never granted under Sec 50.25(k), since it is Park Service policy to confine sleeping to designated camping areas. It may well be that such an across-the-board Ban on sleeping outside official campgrounds would be Constitutionally acceptable if duly promulgated and even-handedly enforced. But the post hoc rationalization belatedly supplied by the Director cannot be thought to provide necessary binding standards where the regulation has none." UNITED STATES v ABNEY, U.S. App D.C. May 11, 1976 at 4-5.]

[2. "Short-time, casual sleeping which does not occur in the context of using the park for living accommodations will not be affected by these regulations." Fed Reg Vol 47 No. 108 June 4, 1982 pg 24301,]

[3. "Definitions: "Demonstration" includes demonstrations, picketing, speech-making, marching, holding vigils, or religious services, and all other like forms of conduct whlch involve the communication, or expression of views or grievances engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the effect, intent, or propensity to draw a crowd, or on-lookers." 36 CFR 50.19(a)(1).]


C) Therefore, whereas UNITED STATES v ABNEY, 534 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1976) at 9851 states: In the unusual circumstances of an individual protestor's round-the-clock vigil unavoidable sleeping "must be taken sufficiently expressive in nature to implicate First Amendment scrutiny in the first instance." And the Supreme Court stated, in BROWN v LOUISIANA, 383 u.s. 181, 141-42 (1966) (plurality): "(First Amendment) rights are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent and reproachful presence...."), the Defense maintains that the activities charged in the instant matter enjoy the protection of the First Amendment's freedom of speech.

A. The Defense also contends that defendant's activities come under the protection of the guarantee of freedom of religion in that,

1) As a basic tenet Defendant's religion demands that he protest against intolerable situations, and that he refuse to cooperate with individuals or groups who bear responsibility for the existence of intolerable situations, or the oppression of others. (See Attachment V)


2) Defendant maintains that a) the existence of a weapons system which has the potential of eliminating every living creature from the Earth, while that system is incremented by new components every day, is an intolerable situation, and b) that the economic policies of the United States cause the oppression of people not only within this country, but also abroad.

3) Therefore, because the defendant's refusal to cooperate poses no more "substantial government interest" that would be posed were the defendant to decide to stay drunk most of the time, and because (assuming that the defendant is wrong with respect to nuclear weapons and oppression) within a democracy the only acceptable method of dealing with peaceful dissent is through dialogue, the Defense maintains that it is inappropriate, as well as unconstitutional, for the Government to seek regulatory remedy for activities of the defendant which have been motivated by his religious beliefs, but rather the Government's proper course would be to convince the defendant that he is wrong.

B. Parenthetically the defendant's vigil conveys an unmistakeable, symbolic, "particularized message." Thereby satisfying CCNV V. WATT

1) When a person, homeless by reason of moral responsibility, spends nearly all his life...summer, fall, winter, spring, rain, snow, sleet, hail, dark of night, heat of day, at the mercy of the elements, harassment, intimidation, imprisonment, and physical assault, at the mercy of the Government and/or "patriotic citizens".,.on a sidewalk, passing out literature which states his opinions, tending signs, and placards upon which are posted his ideas, and engaging passerby, both hostile, and friendly, in conversation intended to express his views, and this activity continues for thirty-two months during which time the opinions, ideas, and views expressed remain constant, then it must be reasonably granted that;

2) the "purpose," "effect, intent, or propensity" of that person is to "express, or communicate" "something." Should an individual "give his life" in an attempt to "express, or communicate" "something, even if the "something" which the individual attempts to "express; or communicate" is a bit too abstract for the average mind to readily comprehend (which by no means establishes that the "something" communicated is other than the Absolute Truth), if nothing else it must be granted that:

3) The lndividual has clearly symbolized, expressed, communicated, demonstrated, and/or illustrated that he has a firm conviction in, and dedication to "SOMETHING" (and certainly there is implicit in this argument on indication the "something" to which the individual illustrates conviction and dedication is Absolutely Wrong.)

C. Whereby Defense argues:






A. 36 CFR 50.27(a) [4] is unconstitutionally vague. As a matter of due process, a law or regulation is void on its face if persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." CONALLY v GENERAL CONSTRUCTION CO, 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). Vagueness occurs when what is permitted and what is proscribed conduct becomes a matter of guesswork. Due process is violated when persons are not given fair notice of what to avoid (See Attachment VI) and the discretion of law enforcement officials,with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcenent, is not limited by explicit legislative standards. See PAPACHRISTOU v CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, 405 U.S. 156 (1971), and cases collected in GRAYNED v CITY OF ROCKFORD, 408 U.S. 104, 108 n3 (1972). In this regulation law enforcement officers are given impermissible discretion.

B. After listing certain activities which may be indicia of "camping," the regulation provides:

".....the above listed activities constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging."

1) The regulation states that "activities (plural) constitute camping," but fails to specify, or even to give some hint as to what conbination of activities constitute camping.

2) "Camping" is then described by the regulation as a situation in which "it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation.... ." (Emphasis added).

3) Therefore it becomes apparent that the focal point of this regulation is the term "living accommodations."

[4 As revised on June 4, 1982 36 CFR 50.27(a) defines "camping" as follows:
"Camping is defined as the use of park land for living accommodation purposes such as sleeping activities, or making preparations to sleep (including the laying down of bedding for the purpose of sleeping), or storing personal belongings, or making any fire, or using any tents or shelter or vehicle for sleeping or doing any digging or earth breaking, or carrying on cooking activities. The above listed activities constitute camping when it reasonably appears, in light of all the circumstances, that the participants, in conducting these activities, are in fact using the area as a living accommodation regardless of the intent of the participants or the nature of any other activities in which they may also be engaging.]


Herein lies the Constitutional deficiency of this regulation. "Living accommodation" is not a word, but a term composed of two words: a) "Living"..which in this context cannot be satisfactorily defined as other than: "the state, or condition of being alive," and b) "Accommodation" ... which, unfortunately (defies any such universal definition. One clear word, plus one vague word, equals one vague term. The Government may argue that the term "living accommodation" is not vague, that it is commonly used, and understood, although undefined by any standard dictionary. The Defense concedes that the term is in common usage, and that there is a widely accepted "common sense" definition of the term, however, the Defense maintains that that "common-sense" definition is understood to be at least shelter from the elements, and, in most minds, with some attendant comforts or conveniences relating to the convenient proparation of food, and perhaps, convenient toilet facilities. Further, if a law enforcement officer, as in the instant matter, is permitted to determine whether or not an individual is "sleeping," [2] a determination which need not necessarily be correct, and the officer is then permitted to reduce "living accommodations" to "sleeping", it must be seen that the officer is permitted sweeping discretion, and it is hard to imagine how the final arbiter of what is prohibited conduct can be other than the law enforcement officer.

C. "Free, convenient living space" is twice cited in the analysis of the regulation, "Federal Register June 4, 1982 Vol 47 No 108 pgs 24300, and 24332, as justification for the amendment of Sec 50.27(a). These observations lend greater credence to the argument that "living accommodations" defines "convenient living space."

1) Barring a number of interruptions owing, the Defense would contend, to a misunderstanding on the part of the Government as to the meaning and value of the First Amendment, both defendants have

[2 The analysis given in the Federal Register of this regulation compounds the vagueness even further by stating:
"Short-term casual sleeping which does not occur in the context of using the park for living accommodations will not be affected these regulations." Fed Reg Vol 47 No 108 June 4, 1982 pg 24301]


continued their demonstration activities, on a regular basis, for one year prior to, AND for twenty months since the amendment of 36 CFR 50.27(a). (See Attachment VII),

2) The Government may well try to convince this Court, by virtue of the fact that the defendants spend most of their "lives" in Lafayette Park, that therefore, the defendants are "living" in Lafayette Park. Neither defendant can deny that, during the past thirty-two months, most of the time they have been "alive" in Lafayette Park, but, they maintain, solely for the purpose of utilizing a public forum, and that their very "existence" or "survival" clearly illustrates that Lafayette Park provides neither "free",nor "convenient living space." It must be remembered that a Presidential staff member eating his lunch, or strolling though the park,or a tourist feeding the squirrels in the park are also "living" in the park, albeit for shorter periods, as well as different reasons. Certainly, in that context, this Court's room must also be considered the defendants' "living accommodations," while the defendants are within it, because it undoubtedly is more convenient than the park, it is sheltered, and defendants are certainly "living" in it. However, defendant Thomas imagines that, were he alleged to be sleeping in this Court's room, with say, an extra jacket, a briefcase, and a sack lunch , upon his arrest he would probably be charged with something other than "camping." However, perhaps understandably Sec 50.27(a) does not prohibit "living" in undesignated areas, but merely prohibits "living accommodations." Neither defendant feels the slightest remorse for having devoted most of their "living" to an attempt to communicate their heartfelt convictions that society is in desperate need of solutions to extremely pressing problems. Further, both defendants allege that to punish an individual who is "living" primarily to communicate heartfelt convictions, is to toll the death knell of Democracy.

3) Therefore, assuming all of the Government's allegations with respect to the particulars in this matter to be accurate, the Defense maintains that, at best, what the defendants were doing was liviing an uncomfortable existence, without accommodations, and that only the vagueness of this regulation permitted a law enforcement officer to decide that a sidewalk was indeed "living accommodations."


4) Further, not only is the language of the regulations insufficently precise to provide demonstrators with fair notice of which activities they should avoid, but the regulation also provides unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the regulations. Park Service personel are provided no guidelines as to which activities constitute "camping." Attachment XIII) Furthermore, enforcement personnel are not likely to know whether any one of the individually listed activities by itself merits arrest, as is suggested by the second sentence of the amendments, or whether they must consider "all the circumstances," as the next sentence instructs. Finally, although the regulations instruct enforcement personal to consider "all the circumstances," in determining whether camping is taking place, they are also instructsd to ignore "any other activities in which (the participants) may be engaging," which, of course, would include any legitimate First Amendment activity. [5]

So unless:

X.............. "living accommodations means: "a piece of cardboard, some clothing, and material used to "express, or communicate views, opinions, or grievances,

XX.............. and unless "even-handed enforcement in a content neutral manner means: "the arbitrary judgment of a law enforcement officer as to whether or not an individual is 'sleeping', then

XXX..........36CS Sec. 53.Z7(a) must be unconstitutionally value.

[5 "An example of the discretion inherent in this latter determination is evidenced by the Park Service's authorization for participants in a Vietnam veterans' demonstration on the Mall in May 1982 of all-night sleep at a mock Vietnam War-era "firebase" where some of the participants were periodically roused to stand symbolic "guard duty". See Park Service permit to Vietnam Veterans Against the War, dated April 20, 1982 and accompanying letter reprinted in Record Document (RL) 5; the only apparent distinction between the sleeping in the Veterns' demonstration and thee sleeping proposed by the Community for Creative Non-Violence is that the veterans slept on the ground without any shelter. According to the Park Service interpretation of the new regulations ONE'S PARTICIPATION lN A DEMONSTRATION AS A SLEEPER BECOMES IMPERMISSIBLE "CAMPING" WHEN IT IS DONE WITHIN ANY TEMPORARY STRUCTURE ...." (Emphasis added). CCNV v WATT D.C. Civil Action No. 82-02501 Decided March 19, 1983 at pg. 5 Judge Mikva wrote in the majority decision which found for the Plaintiff in this civil action which contested the constitutional validity of 36 CFR 50.27(a).]

Defendants Facts Continued

Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park