THOMAS v. REAGAN

USDC Cr. No. 84-3552

PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

V. SUMMARY OF CAUSES OF ACTION

129 Plaintiff incorporates by reference the causes of action alleged in paragraphs 17-155 of the original Complaint filed November 21, 1984; Plaintiff's Motion for Preservation of Evidence filed February 22, 1985; and Plaintiff's Motion for Consolidation of the Hearing with Trial on the Merits filed April 10, 1985, and adds EMPHATICALLY that these do NOT include all causes of action, but, plaintiff hopes, should be sufficient to obtain relief.

130. The following causes of action, originally listed in Plaintiff's Clarification of (the original) Complaint, are provided for the Court's convenience once again:

a. Unwarranted seizure, destruction of, or failure to return literature, tools, signs, and camera, No receipts provided in any of the seizures; undue delay in returning property to plaintiff; careless handling of plaintiff's property. See Complaint paragraphs 30, pg, 46, 87, 93, 97, 109, 112, 117, 118. See also page 196, Order for Preliminary Injunction, para. 3.

b. Delay of presentment to Court. See Complaint paragraphs 87, 91, 93, 97, 131; see also page 197, Order for Preliminary Injunction, para. 4.

c. Assault. See Complaint paragraphs 69, 93, 132.

d. Destruction of evidence. See Complaint paragraphs 74, 93, 133.

e. False testimony and/or obstruction of justice. See Complaint paragraphs 47, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 89, 90, 110, 134; see also page 197, Order for Preliminary Injunction, para. 4.

f. Police harassment and intimidation, See Complaint paragraphs 22, 39, 44-45, 52, 59, 62, 64, 69, 81, 82, 83, 93, 104, 107, 127; attachment 10.

g. Interference with practice of chosen profession and religion, and deprivation of association, through intimidation arid/or arrest. See Complaint Paragraphs 22, 28, 30, 31, 32, 40, 45, 46, 48. 50, 66, 67, 69 70, 72, 74, 76, 85, 87, 91, 93, 97, 100, 116, 117; attachments 3, 9, 11, 17, 19, 22.

h. False arrests, or arrests Without probable cause (under color of regulations, traditions, customs or rituals) (see Complaint paragraph 129; see also Page 196, Order for Preliminary Injunction, para. 4):

1. Resulting in dismissal. See Complaint paragraphs 22, 28, 30, 31, 40, 48, 67, 72, 74, 91, 97.

2. Resulting in acquittal. See Complaint paragraphs 93, 100.

3. Resulting in bond forfeiture. See, Complaint paragraph 69.

4. Resulting in conviction. See Complaint paragraphs 32, 45, 50, 66, 70, 85, 87.

i. False imprisonment . See Complaint paragraphs 31, 32, 45, 48, 50, 66, 69, 70, 72, 87, 91, 93, 97, 117, 130.

j. Instructions from superiors (intra- and inter-agency). See Complaint paragraphs 44, 47a, 48, 57, 58, 62-66, 67, 70, 72, 79, 93, 97.

k. Lack of any clear definition of the terms "camping" and "storage of property" (50.27) or "structure" (50.14), resulting in the selective and discriminatory targeting of plaintiff and his associates to disrupt their legitimate, non-violent activities. See Complaint paragraphs 47a, 78, 89, 122, 123-125, 126, 136, 139, 140, 173, 174; attachment 30.

l. Refusal to define the terms'"casual sleep" and "storage of property" pursuant to July 19, 1984 order from this Court (see Complaint paragraphs 101, 102, 103, 106; attachment 30), which has resulted in continued harassment (see Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Preservation of Evidence filed 2/26/85).

m. Additional overt actions supporting the allegation of a conspiracy. See Complaint paragraphs 23, 24, 28, 30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 52, 54, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87 88, 91, 93, 97, 99, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 117, 118; see also Plaintiff's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Consolidate, filed 4/10/85, and attachments thereto.

SUMMARY OF COUNTS

Count One

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Fourteenth Amendments: 42 USC 1983 1985(3) (Conspiracy to subvert protected expression of thoughts and beliefs)

131. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-33, 58-128, 129-130.

132. During the course of his demonstration activities in front of the White House, plaintiff repeatedly has been subjected to malicious and arbitrary arrests, harassment, willful seizure and destruction of his signs, literature and other property and other intentional and unlawful restrictions upon his activities. Defendants have initiated, directed, approved, and/or jailed to halt such arbitrary and intentional conduct.

133. The purpose and effect of such activities by defendants and their agents has been to interfere with the ongoing critical activities conducted by plaintiff, to chill plaintiff's continued effort to discover a social alternative to nuclear armament, and to intimidate others who might have had interest in his ideas. Over the same period of time, numerous other individuals similarly situated have not been subjected to a similar pattern of malicious and arbitrary treatment.

134. The defendants' actions represent a post hoc bureaucratic remedy to constitutionally-protected critical activity which poses no substantial threat to government interests beyond questioning the sanity of government's activity regarding weapons proliferation. Defendants' unreasonable interference with plaintiff's rights is not founded on a legitimate restriction Of the manner, time or place of expression, but rather reveals a wholesale attack on traditional and time honored rights secured in the Constitution and Bill of Rights and designed to protect against despotic government, in violation of 42 USC 1983 and/or 1985(3).

Count Two

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Fourteenth Amendments; 42 USC 1983, 1985(3) (Freedom of religion or belief)

135. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 9, 18-20, 26-28, 35, 65. 114, 118.

136. Plaintiff's profession is philosophy, and his religion is exercised through his life. Plaintiff strives to make his every action a demonstration of his ideals. All defendant agents of defendant Government either are (a) opposed to plaintiff's philosophy and the peaceful exercise of plaintiff's religion, and have acted to suppress plaintiff's communicative actions because his ideas oppose the official war policy defendants serve in pursuit of their personal livelihoods, or (b) they are ignorant of plaintiff's philosophy ar religion because they have refused to listen, are afraid of what they do not understand, and have acted to suppress plaintiff's communicative activities for that reason. In either instance, all defendants' actions effectively have suppressed plaintiff's God-given rights, and illustrate a profound disrespect for the most fundamental precepts of democratic society.

137. The profound disregard for fundamental human dignity, evidenced by all defendants, speaks loudly in support of the argument that money demeans the value of human life. Plaintiff's appearance, like that of a Hasidic Jew, was produced by the exercise of his religious beliefs. The exercise of those beliefs served to subtly alter the social appearance of plaintiff"s person. Judging from plaintiff's outward appearance, defendants made a value judgment regarding plaintiff worth as a person.

138. Police officers and other public officials swear to uphold a "Code of Ethics" in their official capacities. They also have a personal code of ethics ... most frequently, in this country, "'christian." If the sky opened up and Jesus (Son of the Christian God and Chief Philosopher among "christians") walked down from Heaven and started passing out peace literature on the White House sidewalk, "christian" defendants would, we must assume, greet his activities with love and respect in their personal capacities. However, defendants in their official capacities, empowered and directed to employ force and violence in service of the interests of the State, might well be instructed by the State (upon which they depend for Money/living accommodations) to write and enforce anti-eyesore" regulations. As "christians" defendants Could Only be expected to enforce an anti-eyesore" regulation against Jesus if they were hypocrites.

"Whatsoever you do to this, the least of my brothers, you do also to me," said Jesus.

"FACTS as guidelines for any self-respecting Christians (a) love enemies; (b) do good to them that do evil; (c) put up the sword (Bomb): those who use weapons perish by them; (d) no one can love God and hate anyone, even 'enemies': or love Money and Power." (Sita Akka, August 25, 1985)

139. Defendants, if "christians," certainly haven't looked upon plaintiff as a "Son of God" or Jesus' brother. The FACTS show they treated him like a "bum." The FACTS presented by the Complaint illustrate that defendants,in the personal exercise of their own or someone else's prejudgments, are not above twisting a law of the State as a vehicle by which to exercise the force and violence vested in their official capacities against a harmless individual. Further, the FACTS show defendants and their agents engaged in this behavior intentionally, maliciously and repeatedly.

140. Regardless of any moral problems which this question may pose to defendants when they stand in their personal capacities before their Creator, the FACT remains that their ACTIONS constitute a substantial violation of 42 USC 1983 and 1985(3).

Count Three

First, Fifth, Ninth, Fourteenth Amendments; 42 USC 1983, 1985(3) Unconstitutional Promulgation or Interpretation of Regulations. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 3, 31, 57, 72, 75, 76, 88, 83, 101, 106.

142. Plaintiff's activities in the area north of the White House express opposition to what plaintiff believes is the government's MAD thermo-nuclear policies. while symbolically illustrating the need for individuals to, and a manner in which nations can, work creatively and cooperatively. Defendant Government and all its defendant agents have employed the regulatory apparatus, implemented through force, violence, and intimidation to mute plaintiff's message by the expedient of selectively enforcing regulations ta color plaintiff's life of religious dissent as "living accommodations" or "unsustainable impact" (36 CFR 50.27(a)), falsely labeling his peaceful demonstration activities as a "threat to presidential security" (36 CFR 50.19(e)(9)(10)), and seeking to characterize certain of his harmless demonstration activities aa "general injury."

143. Plaintiff alleges that 36 CFR 50,19(e)(11)( published in the Federal Register, August 20, 1983, is not justified by any substantial government interest, but rather is merely another action in furtherance of defendants' aging conspiracy to legitimize the use of violence to silence dissent.

144. Regulations intended to prohibit or restrict harmless expressive behavior in appeasement of hostile public reaction, or other constitutionally-impermissible motive by the government, and selectively applied to deprive plaintiff of privileges, and immunities secured and guaranteed by the First, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, and UDHR, in violation of 42 USC 1985(3).

AUSA Marcy: "Your Honor, there has to come a time, we would submit, when you say 'enough.' He was on probation for the same thing..."

The Court: "I know. but what does that mean? There comes a time when you say 'Enough, get away from there, don't come back any more?' You had a magistrate do that to him." (Judge William Bryant, USA v.Thomas, USDC CR 83-0056, Tr. July 7, 1983, p. 9.)

Count Four

42 USC 1983, 1985(3) Unconstitutional Promulgation of Regulation 36 CFR 50,19(e)(11)

145. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 31, 76, 77, 79, 83, 84, 113, 114, 117-126.

146. Defendants' most recent assault on democracy 36 CFR 50.19(e)(11) reflects, perhaps as clearly as any other, both the method and intent of their zeal to prevent the presentation of peace on earth as necessary for survival., and a viable alternative to the State's party line.

147. Faced with "the problem" of critical signs in Lafayette Park, various defendants had various contacts (not all reflected in the Complaint) with the media in which they attempted to influence public opinion with regard to their intended . schemes. Around the same time as these contacts were made, defendant regulation writers cast about their minds for some pretext by which to justify regulations the intent of which, on their face, defendants knew to be unjustifiable.

148. Those poor regulation writers' overworked minds, over the course of the years have been edging closer and closer to exposing the true motive of their actions, as evidenced by the pretexts offered in justification of their handiwork:

(1) "impacts the area cannot sustain" (36 CFR 50.27):

(2) "presidential security" (fabricating an incident to justify 36 CFR 50.19(e)(9)(10)); and

(3) "(16 written) complaints from the public" (36 CFR 50.19(e)(11)).

Fortunately the Supreme Court has decided in the past that hostile opinion is not a permissible motive for gagging dissent Unfortunately defendant writers tacked on to 36 CFR 50.19(e)(11) a few other exaggerations. mistakes, or whatever, concerning the *Current Situation in Lafayette Park." which doubtlessly, if called upon to do so, they hope to be able to represent as "substantial government interests."

149. Coupled with defendant writers' cleverly disguised but insupportable innuendos, plaintiff alleges, the evidence will show defendants' representations to have been embellished fabrications in violation of 42 USC 1983 and 1985(3).

Count Five

First, Fifth, Ninth, Fourteenth Amendments; 42 USC 1983, 1985(3) Unconstitutional Promulgation and Selective Enforcement of 36 CFR 50.27

150.Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 28, 68, 72, 73, 82, 85, 96, 98, 102, 104. and the following points and authorities:

"We need not differ with the view of the Court of Appeals that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstration is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the First Amendment." (CLARK v. CCNV, Majority Opinion p. 4, Sillybus filed June 29, 1984.)

"I listened to the tape, and they locked the man up for going to sleep. And he says that is part of his -- he is out there forever, 24 hours."(Judge William Bryant, USA v. Thomas, USDC CR 82-358, sentencing transcript, December 22, 1983, p. 4.)

151. The majority of arrests to which plaintiff has been subjected, as summarized in paragraph 130(h)(supra.), have been for purported violations of the restrictions on "camping" as set forth in 36 CFR 50.27. These arrests have arisen in situations where, if a conviction resulted, Thomas was engaging in activity that, absent the color added by defendants' allegations that plaintiff had been "sleeping," could not reasonably have resulted in a conviction under 36 CFR 50.27 as amended June 4, 1982.

152. Plaintiff's around-the-clock expressive presence in front of the White House is reasonably intended to communicate to others the urgency of plaintiff's pleas for nuclear disarmament and is also reasonably intended to demonstrate to all observers the need, in this society, for extraordinary personal commitment by individuals who sincerely desire to make nuclear disarmament become a reality in this world. Thus, even if sleeping next to his signs in Lafayette Park, plaintiff is reasonably seeking to communicate these messages to others. To this date sleeping in connection with a demonstration enjoys protection pursuant to the First Amendment. USA v ABNEY, and CCNV v. CLARK.

153. Defendants recognized plaintiff's activities as rights and privileges guaranteed under the Constitution to be free of interference during the course of those activities, and saw themselves as legally stymied in their earliest official efforts to interfere with those activities.

154. Subsequent to the November 2, 1981 meeting with CCNV, defendants perceived not only a greater threat to the administrative policies represented in their official capacities in groups of individuals who might

adopt plaintiff's method of communication, but also a pretext by which they hoped, under color of regulations, to terminate, or hamper plaintiff's signs and presence on the White House sidewalk.

155. Plaintiff has attempted to modify his conduct so as to maintain his round-the-clock expressive presence in a manner which does not offend the ban against 'camping" in Lafayette Park.

156. The regulations proscribing "camping' are unreasonably vague and fail to�provide plaintiff with enough notice as to precisely what criteria constitutes the proscribed activity.

157. Plaintiff has also sought clarification from various officials of the Department of Interior, U.S. Park Police and National Park Service as to the meaning of the term "casual sleep," which is not prohibited by the regulations against "camping." In response, plaintiff has received no definitive clarification, but instead has been flatly refused any clarification as to precisely what activities constitute "camping." At the same time, plaintiff continuously has been harassed, threatened with arrest, and actually arrested in connection with allegations of sleeping activities during his twenty-four hour presence in the Park, at the instigation or direction of some of those same defendants.

158. As a direct and proximate result of what plaintiff alleges to be intentional vagueness in the language of this regulation, plaintiff has been subjected by various law enforcement officials to selective and arbitrary enforcement in furtherance of the conspiracy, to plaintiff's irreparable harm.

159. Armed with the pretext of CCNV's proposed demonstration, defendants passed a regulation. Long after CCNV had ceased to be a factor, defendants suspended the delay of effectiveness of that regulation, and selectively enforced it against plaintiff with the intent to stifle protected conduct in violation of UDHR and 42 USC 1985(3).

Count Six

First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments; 42 USC 1983, 1985(7) Unconstitutional Enforcement of 36 CPR 50.19(e)(9)(10); perjurious, false, or misleading testimony to misrepresent demonstrations

160. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 3, 28, 80, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 96, 104, 109, 110, 111.

161. Plaintiff's activities, the First Amendment, and Court decisions combined to create a "problem" for defendant government which its defendant agents sought to solve by entering together into a scheme designed and intended to subvert the First Amendment and judicial precedent through false representation, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and denial of due process, destruction and confiscation of property, harassment, intimidation, arrest and imprisonment.

162. To further this unlawful conspiracy, defendants caused 36 CFR 50,19(e)(9)(101) to be worded with the intent to prohibit the large signs with which defendants knew that for over two years plaintiff had demonstrated harmlessly.

163. Defendants knew that the activities they intended to prohibit, plaintiff's possession of large signs on the White House sidewalk, did not pose any physical threat to the President. Subsequently defendants conspired to subvert the law of the land through perjurious testimony. The testimony and sworn statements of defendants Lindsey and Parr from May 3, 1983 illustrate an example of this behavior in violation of plaintiff's First, Fifth, Ninth Amendment rights, 42 USC 1983 and 1985(3).

"The defendants' claim that large signs are likely to be used to scale the White House fence fell apart at the trial. There was no evidence that any sign belonging to the plaintiffs or anybody else had ever been used to scale the fence." .(ERA v. Clark, USDC CA 83-1243, Judge William Bryant Memorandum Opinion, April 25, 1984, p. 22.)

Amended Complaint - Continued

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