73. Some individuals dabbling in the School of Social Intercourse ma have used
the White House sidewalk and Lafayette Park to "store personal property" in the
course of their studies, a situation to which defendants may have an entirely justifiable
objection. However, defendants also had entirely adequate and current regulations
with which to cope with the situation. Additionally, during the entire period in which
plaintiff conducted his expressive activities on the White House sidewalk, NEVER did
Thomas have or hold interest in ANY "worldly possessions" beyond the clothes he
was wearing, a jacket or coat, a sleeping bag, one piece of cardboard, one piece of
plastic, several "holy books" and literature, a plastic bag or briefcase for protecting
"holy books" and literature, and
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signs. The only "property" which Thomas personally added to that collection during the
entire period in which he has (been forced to) conduct the same expressive activities
across the street are material for the painting or construction of signs, which was
never "stored" but immediately or, in the case of hammer and paintbrushes, regularly
utilized. In any event, if Thomas' "storage" was a "problem" it would have been
addressable under 36 CFR 50.7.
74. Defendants found their attempts to disrupt plaintiff's activities hampered by the
First Amendment until the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) submitted
plans to the Park Service which seized upon and expanded plaintiff's idea of a
continuous vigil.
75. Because the Secret Service saw "signs on the White House sidewalk" as "the
wave of the future," there were meetings between the Secret Service and "individuals
and legal people from Interior and the Park Police to work out some kind of an
arrangement" (defendant Parr testified on December 13, 1983, ERA v. Clark, USDC
CA 83-12433).
76. Some of the meetings between the Secret Service, the Park Police, and the
Department of Interior took place around the time of the drafting of the "Camping"
regulation.
77. On June 4, 1982 defendants Fish, Bangert, and Robbins, with the
review and approval of superiors, published 36 CFR 50.27 in the Federal Register.
That regulation was purportedly "not to stifle First Amendment activity, but to protect
undesignated areas from activities for which they are unsuited and impacts which the
area cannot sustain." (Fed. Reg. June 4, 1982, page 24304.) Defendant Fish
suspended the thirty day delay of effectiveness provided for in 5 USC 553, although
no "good cause" existed, in order that the regulation might be expeditiously,
selectively, and arbitrarily enforced against plaintiff.
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78. When notified by defendants and their agents of their intentions to arrest him
under the regulation which came out of those meetings, Thomas took numerous steps
to make defendants aware that such a move would not be legally proper with respect
to his specific activity.
79. Despite plaintiff's notice, defendants from the DOI Solicitor's office who
personally had been involved in the drafting of 36 CFR 50.27, and who should have
been personally acquainted with the expressive nature of plaintiff's activities,
supervised plaintiff's arrest on June 17, 1982. Those defendants knew, or should have
known, that plaintiff's presence was not unsuited to the area, and that his activities
caused no impacts which the area could not sustain. Those defendants have never
been called to account for their supervisory decisions with respect to that arrestˇ But
those decisions, especially in light of the history of the enforcement of those
regulations, illuminate defendants' intent that 36 CFR 50.27, quite apart from any
"substantial government interest" they might serve, could also be selectively,
arbitrarily, and capriciously directed against plaintiff to disrupt his legitimate
communicative activities under color of regulation.
80. During September, 1982, defendant Lindsey gave false or obstructive
testimony before a U.S. Magistrate which colored what Lindsey knew or should have
known to be harmless behavior as criminal activity.
81. On December 9, 1982 and on numerous other occasions before and since that
time, officers of the U.S. Secret Service Executive Protection Branch kicked down
signs which Thomas leaned against the White House fence. This was done in 1982
with the knowledge of defendants or their agents that no valid regulations were then in
place to permit this interference with plaintiff's First Amendment activities. During the
course of
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these activities by defendants' agents and on numerous other occasions, the
offending agents addressed plaintiff by such derogatory names as "dirt ball" and
"scumbag."
82. As a direct and ultimate result of defendants' selective enforcement of 36 CFR
50.27 against plaintiff, his continuous presence was effectively ended. Plaintiff was
forced to transport his signs out of the public park during the hours of darkness.
83. On January 13, 1983, James Watt, then Secretary of Interior, issued a
memorandum to Moody Tidwell. (Attachment 3) That memorandum was prompted by
plaintiff's legitimate demonstration activities on the White House sidewalk, and remains
as an indication of defendants' official policy and stated intent with respect to
plaintiff's continuous presence in the Park and his effective but harmless
communications media of large signs. (Attachment 2, p. 33574, "...for example the
Ellipse on the south side of the White House.")
84. Mr. Watt and the defendants knew the First Amendment prevented them from
interfering with the activities which prompted the January 13 memo, because, in and
of themselves, plaintiff's signs and his continuous presence presented no threat to any
legitimate governmental interest. Therefore, to mask their true intent, defendants
developed euphemisms by which to refer to plaintiff and his activities, and were
careful to represent their impermissible efforts to color those activities through
regulation as content neutral across the board bans. For the purpose of representing
what they knew to be harmless, protected signs as a "threat to presidential security,"
defendants went at least as far as to present, under oath, insupportable and
erroneous testimony and evidence to a U.S. Federal District Court. L
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85. As.a direct and proximate result of the fact that plaintiff transported his signs
back into the Park during daylight hours, defendants again tried harassment,
intimidation, and arrest as their initial methods of coping with "the problem" that still
remained after plaintiff's accommodations of Court rulings regarding being in the Park
during the night.
86. On or about March 11, 1983, defendant Merillat wrongfully removed Thomas
and his signs from Lafayette Park and from the White House sidewalk. Defendant
Canfield of the D.C. Metropolitan Police later testified under oath:
"I was summoned down there (to the White House sidewalk) by the
officials of the uniformed Secret Service and by members of the United States
Park Police in a joint effort to address a problem that they were encountering
with a protester.... Their intentions were to inform him to abate the nuisance
and to move it off federal property. That's how I became involved."
87. On April 22, 1983 defendants ˇFish, Robbins, Bangert and Arnett published 36
CFR 50.19(e)(9)(10)ˇ, and, in the opinion of Judge William Bryant, U.S. District Court,
violated 5 USC 553 by suspending the 30-day delay of effectiveness, and ordered
plaintiff's arrest.
88. After preliminary judicial review by Judge Bryant, defendants withdrew those
proposed regulations, but not before ordering plaintiff' arrest on April 27', 1983
pursuant to the April 22, 1983 regulations.
89. On May 3, 1983 defendants Lindsey and Parr both swore under oath that an
individual had used one of plaintiff's signs to scale the White House fence, Judge
William Bryant found that those allegations "fell apart at trial."
90. On May 5, 1983 Thomas was arrested during the course of a demonstration
to protest the May 3 testimony of defendants Parr and Lindsey. This arrest was
without probable cause, but remained in the system until December, 1984, when it
was disposed of pursuant to Thomas's motion to dismiss for destruction of evidence
by the Secret Service.
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Amended Complaint - Continued
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