statement about "precisely what is meant by the term 'storage of personal property.'" Robbins replied:
which items may accompany a demonstrator does not clarify the quantity of possessions a demonstrator may maintain in Lafayette Park. Responding to a letter from the ACLU to the Chief of the United States Park Police questioning plaintiffs' repeated arrests, an Assistant Solicitor, National Capital Parks, asserted that
29. at Exhibit 6. The Solicitor could be no more explicit in defining the precise "quantity" of permitted items that would render a demonstrator vulnerable to criminal sanctions than to suggest that Picciotto "limit the quantity of materials she keeps in Lafayette Park." Id. Nonetheless, he maintained, the position that literature or personal property "reasonably required during any one 24-hour period is not considered to violate the storage regulations has been communicated to Park Police and forms the touchstone for their enforcement of the storage regulations." Id.
plaintiffs charged with illegal camping have featured swearing matches between police testifying that one of the plaintiffs was observed to be sleeping and the alleged camper testifying that he or she was not asleep. The sleeping-therefore-camping issue is troubling because, if a person is in the park 24 hours per day, for days on end, it is judicially noticeable that some of that time must be consumed by sleeping. It is also judicially noticeable that casual dozing in a park is a generally accepted American tradition but for the regulation which forbids use of a national park for living accommodations. An alleged camper's claim to 1 iving accommodations elsewhere does not yield a clean cut issue for decision because, for example, it is entirely possible for a person to maintain more than one living accommodation. As the regulation is drawn and administered, a decision by a plaintiff, the police, or a court as to whether one of the plaintiffs is maintaining an impermissible living accommodation in the park is seldom free from reasonable doubt.
assurance that the identification is authentic and providing means for later getting in touch with the person who has identified himself." Kolender, 461 U.S. at 357 (quoting People v. Solomon, 33 Cal. App. 3d 429, 108 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1973)). It was left to the California police to decide whether a suspect had provided "credible and reliable" identification, just as the Lafayette Park regulations delegate to the U.S. Park Police the decisions as to how much personal property one "reasonably require[s] during one 24 hour period" or what constitutes a living accommodation. Kolender held that this delegation "necessarily 'entrust[s] lawmaking "to the moment-to-moment judgment of the policeman on his beat,'" Id. at 361 (quoting Smith, 415 U.S. at 575, quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 120 (1969) (Black, J,, concurring)).
a finding that the Park Police officers have taken advantage of such opportunity in dealing with plaintiffs, the Department of the Interior, like the State of California, must "establish standards by which the officers may determine whether the suspect has complied with the .... [regulations]." Id, at 361.