MARY HUDDLE, et al. Plaintiffs v. Civil Action No. 88-3130 JHG RONALD REAGAN, et al. Defendants
BY:
FREDERICK D. COOKE, JR.
Corporation Counsel, D.C.MARTIN L. GROSSMAN
Deputy Corporation Counsel, D.C.ARTHUR D. BURGER , [181933]
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.
Attorney for Defendant
District Building, Room 314
1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone No. 727-6303
Michael J. Martinez, Esquire,
Ass't U.S. Attorney, Room 4126,
Judiciary Center Building,
555 4th Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20001;William Thomas,
1440 N Street, N.W., Apt. 410,
Washington, D.C. 20005,
andScott Galindez,
Mary Huddle, Philip Joseph
and Sunrise S. Harmony,
P.O. Box 27217,
Washington, D.C. 20038,
on this the 9th day of December, 1988.
//s// Arthur D. Burger
ARTHUR D. BURGER
Assistant Corporation Counsel, D.C.
MARY HUDDLE, et al. Plaintiffs v. Civil Action No. 88-3130 JHG RONALD REAGAN, et al. Defendants
I. The Claims Against The District of Columbia Are Barred By The Statute Of Limitations.
(D.D.C. 1987) and Renay Hunter v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 88-0718 (Slip opinion of Oct. 25, 1988 attached hereto as exhibit B). But cf. Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F.Supp. 459 (D.D.C. 1985) and Underwood v. District of Columbia Armonry Bd., 816 F.2d 769, 773 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
"We therefore hold, as we believe the District of Columbia courts would hold, that under District of Columbia law the pendency of an action involuntarily dismissed without prejudice does not operate to toll the running of the statute of limitations." 666 F.2d at 611.
II. The Evidence Adduced In C.A. No. 84-3552 Demonstrate That the District of Columbia Is Entitled To Summary Judgment.
arrested Mr. Thomas until Mr. Thomas set the structure on fire, causing substantial damage to the White House fence. Mr. Thomas maintained that his action in setting the structure on fire was not willful but a jury convicted him on a felony charge of desctruction of property. F-1453-83. This was the only occasion in which captain Canfield arrested Mr. Thomas. Magistrate Burnette concluded:
"Under the totality of circumstances, defendant Canfield acted reasonably in first approaching the plaintiff and subsequently arresting him for arson following his conduct in 'torching' the structure. Thus, until the plaintiff committed a felony, the destruction of property by fire in the officer's presence, defendant's entire course of conduct towards the plaitniff is noteworthy in that he did not immeidately arrest the plaintiff on March 8, March 9, or on March 11, 1983, but provided him with a series of continued warnings until he set the structure on fire on March 11, 1983." (Memorandum Opinion p. 15).
"that even if the instant suit were not time barred, there is no evidence upon which to conclude that Captain Canfield acted improperly in handling Mr. Thomas or the "structure."
III. Plaintiffs Have Alleged No Unconstitutional Policy or Custom Against the District of Columbia.
municipal liability. See Monell v. NYC Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. 914 (1988); and Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
FREDERICK D. COOKE, JR.
Corporation Counsel, D.C.MARTIN L. GROSSMAN
Deputy Corporation Counsel,
D.C. Civil DivisionBY:
//s// arthur d. burger
ARTHUR. BURGER; [181933]
Assistant Corporation Counsel,
Attorney for Defendant
District Building, Room 314
1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Telephone No. 727-6303