UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARY HUDDLE and PHILIP JOSEPH, et. al., )
                                        )
          versus                        )  CA 88-3130-JHG
                                        )  Judge Joyce Hens Green
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, et. al.,          )
                   defendants           )
________________________________________)

PLAINTIFFS' OPPOSITION TO
FEDERAL DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND RENEWAL OF PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

1. PROTECTIVE ORDER

On October 25, 1989 the Federal Defendants moved for a protective order, asserting that the individual federal defendants are immune from suit.

"(G)overnment officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person should have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, at 818.

Reading the Complaint, as plaintiffs have drafted it (See, e.g., id. paras. 20, 73; also Amended Complaint paras. ll, 43), defendants cannot conceivably qualify for immunity, because the First Amendment was so clearly established that defendants were, forced to expend considerable energy in circumventing it. See, e.g., Administrative Record, 36 CFR 7.96(g)(5)(x)(B)(2), which, "due to its size" (Defendants' Motion to Dismiss filed December 2l, l988, p. 28, ftn. 4), federal defendants have not filed in this case.

"If the law was clearly established at time public employee's conduct occurred, official is presumed to have known about it and unless he can bring forward undisputed facts establishing that because of extraordinary circumstances he neither knew nor should have known of unlawfulness of his conduct, employee is not entitled to qualified immunity defense." Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 479 (1979).

2. SANCTIONS

With respect to their Opposition to plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Discovery, the federal defendants appear to rely entirely on Mr. Martinez' claim (apparently certified by Mr. Bates) that "Mr. Thomas already possesses most of the documents he requests, having obtained them in previous lawsuits." Defendants' Motion for Protective Order, p. 2.

This claim is astonishing. Having litigated those "previous lawsuits," Mr. Martinez certainly should know that discovery in those lawsuits ended in July l986. It is clear that plaintiffs have only requested l) materials which have been generated since July, l986 (see Defendants' Motion, Exhibit l, paras. 3 and 4), which they do not have in their possession; or 2) materials which plaintiffs did request on discovery in the previous lawsuits (and which Magistrate Burnett required defendants to produce), but which defendants did not produce and which, therefore, plaintiffs still do not possess. SEE Defendants' Motion, Exhibit l, paras. l and 2.

Certainly Mr. Martinez has a responsibility to defend his clients, but, as an officer of justice, he should realize that it is unethical and contrary to the interests of his high office to make factually deficient representations to the Court.

Moreover, this not the first time plaintiffs have taken serious objection to the validity of Mr. Martinez' representa-tions. SEE, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike Defendants' Exhibit 4, filed January 3, l989; see also Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions or Other Disciplinary Action, filed February 8, l989; Plain-tiffs' Response to the Federal Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions Or Other Disciplinary Action, filed March 4, l989.

Thus the Court is faced with the same old question of which party is most accurately representing "actual reality"? See, United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188, 192.

Because of the gravity of the principles involved here (see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1970); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64; Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 904 (6th Dist. 1977), cert denied; Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Brown v. Louisana, 383 U.S. 131; Cantwell v. Connetticut, 310 U.S. 303; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 478 (1965); Marbury v. Madison, 5 (1 Cranch) U.S. 137 (1803); Murdock v. Pennsylvania 319 U.S. 105; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147; Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Thomas v. Review Board 450 U.S. 707), et. seq, plaintiffs urge the Court to conduct an inquiry for the purpose of determining whether Mr. Martinez can support his claims regarding plaintiffs' religion (e.g., Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions, February 8, l989), and as to the materials which Mr. Martinez presently asserts are in plaintiffs' possession.

Respectfully submitted,

_____________________________
William Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20038
202-462-0757


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARY HUDDLE and PHILIP JOSEPH, et. al., )
                                        )
          versus                        )  CA 88-3130-JHG
                                        )  Judge Joyce Hens Green
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, et. al.,          )
                   defendants           )
________________________________________)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I William Thomas, hereby state that, on this 20th day of November, 1989 I caused true copies of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Opposition To Federal Defendants' Motion For Protection Order And Renewal Of Plaintiffs' Motion For Sanctions to be hand-delivered to the offices of U.S. Attorney Michael Martinez at Judiciary Square, 555 4th Street N.W., Washington, D.C., and the Office of the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia, 1350 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

_____________________________
William Thomas