MARY HUDDLE and PHILIP JOSEPH, et. al., )
                                        )
       Plaintiffs, Pro Se               )
                                        )   CA 88-3130-JHG
          versus                        )
                                        )   Judge Joyce Hens Green
RONALD WILSON REAGAN, et. al.,          )
________________________________________)

On September 18, 1990, plaintiffs filed yet another Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order in this matter, as well as a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, in yet another, hopefully not futile, attempt to get a fair hearing on the facts of a simple matter.

On September 24, 1990, with the apparent intent of denying plaintiffs a fair hearing, Mr. Martinez filed yet another opposition framed on intricately crafted misrepresentations, half-truths, and unfounded speculation.

What plaintiffs find most outrageous in his latest filing is Mr. Martinez's craftily fashioned footnote 3 on page 4.

"On July 18, 1990, a notice was sent to Picciotto that she was required to appear in Court on August 15, 1990 at 9:30 a.m. Although we believe Picciotto did not appear at the appointed date and time, the undersigned are not completely sure that she failed to appear. In any case, the Criminal Division of the United States Attorney's office intends to issue another notice requiring Picciotto to appear in Court in mid-October, 1990."

In fact, the notice sent to Picciotto did not require her to "appear in court," it required her to appear in "the U.S. Attorney's Office," 555 4th Street N.W. SEE, Exhibit 1.

Hence, Picciotto did not appear in court on August 15, 1990.

Rather she went to the office of David Reiser of the D.C. Public Defender's Office. Mr. Reiser contacted the U.S. Attorney's Office, and was informed that the charges against Picciotto would be dismissed. SEE, Exhibit 2.

Thus, more than a month later when they filed their motions on September 18, 1990, plaintiffs had every reason to believe, pursuant to representations of the U.S. Attorney's Office, that no charges would be brought. 1/

Mr. Martinez assumes, as usual, that plaintiffs have failed to show irreparable injury. Of course, this assumption fails to consider that the actions of the police officers, and the seizure of the flags have caused the loss of First Amendment freedoms.

"The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. See New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713." Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 437 at 373.

Next we have the silly claim that "Picciotto, in an apparent effort to test the sign size restrictions, attached two United States flags to her signs." Opposition pg. 1. Then, Mr. Martinez actually had the audacity to write, "(t)his factual recitation is drawn from plaintiffs' and defendants' June submissions." Id. ftn. 1.

This "factual recitation" is nothing short of nonsense. Factual evidence would conclusively prove that there was only one United States flag. But this minor point only shows Mr. Martinez is, at best, unclear on the actual facts. Far more prejudicial,

1/ For the U.S. Attorney to now suddenly decide to "issue another notice requiring Picciotto to appear in Court in mid-October, 1990," would seem to press the Federal Rules' "speedy trial" requirements beyond the limits.

is Mr. Martinez's wildly speculative "fact" that Picciotto was engaged in an "effort to test the sign size restrictions." Nothing could be further from the truth.

Plaintiffs have asserted all along that they are engaged in an "effort to communicate with the general public on issues of broad public concern." 36 C.F.R. 7.96 (g)(5)(B)(2) is presently before the Court in this case upon plaintiffs' allegation that it is constitutionally invalid as the product of a conspiracy intended to disrupt plaintiffs' communicative activities or cause their imprisonment.

"36 CFR 9.76(g)(5)(x)(A)(1)(2)(3)(4)(B)(1) and (2), formerlycodified at 36 CFR 50.19(e)(11)(12), is both unconstitutional, having been promulgated under false pretences and for unconstitutional reasons, and has been unconstitutionally applied. See, Amended Com-plaint, filed November 23, 1988, para. 42, see also, e.g., Summarization of Com-plaint, filed November 21, 1989, e.g. paras. 31, 54, 63, 67; Plain-tiffs' Memorandum in Sup-port of their Application for a Temporary Re-straining Order and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, filed November 21, 1989, pages 6-9; Plaintiffs' (Re-dacted) Response to Federal Defendants' Sup-plemental Motion to Dismiss, filed January 17, 1989, page 15; Complaint, filed September 30, 1988, paras 20, 56, 79." Plaintiff Ellen Thomas' Motion to Supplement, filed December 10, 1989, pgs. 1 and 2.

Although the complaint plainly alleges that this specific regulation was known to be unnecessary, plaintiffs have, and there is no reason to assume otherwise, more important things to do than to test defendants' regulations. Particularly there is no reason to assume that plaintiffs are so stupid as to engineer a regulatory test when, they are plainly smart enough to know, such a test could only be conducted in a judicial system that has never shown them notable hospitality.

Rather than to pay unquestioned deference to Mr. Martinez's

unsupported assertions, plaintiffs submit, the Court should either grant plaintiffs' motions on the strength of their sworn declarations, or hold a hearing to determine whether it is plaintiffs who are testing the regulations, or whether, in fact, it is defendants who are testing to see how much harassment the Court will allow.

"It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amendment rights must survive exacting scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 at 64, 65, see also, NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. at 460, 461.

For the foregoing reasons plaintiffs urge the Court to grant their motions on the papers, or, alternatively to subject the representations made in defendants' opposition to exacting scrutiny before denying plaintiffs' motions.

Respectfully submitted this __th day of September, 1990,

____________________________
Concepcion Picciotto,
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Post Office Box 4931
Washington, D.C. 20008

_____________________________
William Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-462-0757

_____________________________
Ellen Thomas
1440 N Street, N.W. Apt. 410
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-462-0757

I, ______________, hereby state that, on this __th day of September, l990 I caused a copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs Motions for TRO and Writ of Mandamus to be hand-delivered to the office of Michael Martinez, Ass. U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia at Judiciary Square, 555 4th Street N.W., Washington, D.C.