IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-6732

WILLIAM THOMAS, PETITIONER

v.

RONALD REAGAN, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Acting Solicitor General

STUART E. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney General

BARBARA C. BIDDLE
DOUGLAS ROSS
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington. D.C. 20530
(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the district court erred in dismissing petitioner's case.

2. Whether the district court erred in denying petitioner's motion for sanctions without conducting a hearing.

3. Whether summary affirmance by the court of appeals was inappropriate.


IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-6732

WILLIAM THOMAS, PETITIONER

v.
RONALD REAGAN, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1-2) is unreported, but the judgment is noted at 968 F.2d 92 (Table). The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. 4-28) is unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 26, 1992. A petition for rehearing was denied on July 23, 1992. On October 14, 1992, Chief Justice Rehnguist extended the time within to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including November 20, 1992. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on November 20, 1992. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

NO. 92-6732

WILLIAM THOMAS, 
        Petitioner,

      v.

RONALD REAGAN, ET AL., 
       Respondants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It is hereby certified that all parties required to be served have been served copies of the BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of April, 1993.

WILLIAM THOMAS
2817 llTH STREET, N.W.
NO. B
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

April 22, 1993

WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Acting Solicitor General


STATEMENT

For over ten years, petitioner William Thomas, individually and as a member of groups including the "White House Anti-Nuclear Vigil" and "Peace Park Anti-Nuclear Vigil," has sought to maintain a continuous presence in Lafayette Park across from the White House in Washington, D.C., to convey and communicate his views "about what [he] perceive[s] to be the most elemental social ills." United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188, 190 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Pet. App. 5. In connection with alleged government interference with those activities, petitioner brought this action against numerous government agencies and officials for various constitutional, statutory, and regulatory violations. Pet. App 5. The district court dismissed petitioner's case and, without a hearing, denied petitioner's motion for sanctions. Pet App. 5-28. The court of appeals summarily affirmed. Pet App. 1-2.

The district court carefully examined each of petitioner's claims. Specifically, the district court considered petitioner's common law tort claims (Pet. App. 12-14); conspiracy claims (Pet. App. 14-19); claims under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments (Pet. App. 19); equal protection/selective enforcement claim (Pet. App. 19-22); and pattern and practice claim (Pet. App. 22-25).

The district court concluded that the tort claims failed because, among other things, petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Pet. App. 13; see 28 U.S.C. 2675 (a). As to petitioner's conspiracy claims, the court stated that petitioner:

"failed to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy" under the heightened pleading standard for suits against federal officers. Pet. App. 16; see Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 257 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The court found petitioner's Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims "equally deficient under the heightened pleading standard." Yet. App. 19. The court concluded that petitioner's claim for selective enforcement of Department of the Interior regulations did not meet the standard for such a claim because petitioner could not show that the officials were motivated by improper considerations in enforcing the regulations against petitioner. Pet. App. 19-22.

Finally, as to petitioner's claim regarding a pattern and practice of harassment, the court concluded that "there is no factual support for [petitioner's] conclusory allegations that defendants knowingly violated the law, or, for that matter, violated the law at all. There is nothing to reflect that defendants acted other than reasonably in pursuing what they believed constituted regulatory violations." Pet. App. 24-25. The court also denied petitioner's motion for sanctions. Pet. App. 28 n.20.

2. The court of appeals summarily affirmed the district court's dismissal of petitioner's complaint "for the reasons well stated by the district court." Pet. App. 2. In addition, the court of appeals found no abuse of discretion by the district court in refusing to conduct a hearing on petitioner's motion for sanctions. Ibid.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and does not conflict with any decision of this Court or of any other court of appeals. Further review is therefore unwarranted.

1. Raising the same conclusory claims he raised in the courts below, petitioner contends (Pet. 5-51) that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint. Petitioner does not contest the legal principles applied by the district court. 1/ Nor does he suggest that the decision is in conflict with decisions of other courts. Petitioner simply wants this Court to re-examine his case to determine whether his allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. The lower courts have passed on the sufficiency of petitioner's complaint, and that narrow, fact-bond issue does not warrant this Court's review.

2. Petitioner contends (Pet. 51-55) that the district court abused its discretion by not conducting a hearing on his motion for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ P. 11. Petitioner cites no authority in support of that contention. The district court concluded (Pet. App. 28 n.20) that petitioner failed to show cause for the imposition of sanctions;the record and surrounding circumstances supplied an adequate basis to make that determination. See Indianapolis Colts v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1985). The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for sanctions without conducting a hearing.

1/ Petitioner does not challenge the lower courts' use of the heightened pleading standard or contend that the heightened pleading standard in qualified immunity cases is inconsistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Pet. 14 ("The Heightened Pleading Standard Was Met."). Thus, this case presents no occasion for this Court to consider that issue, which the Court has not as yet resolved. See Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1162 (1993) ("no occasion to consider whether our qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases involving individual government officials"); cf. Gov't Br. in Opposition in Jones v. Stephens, No. 92-6874 (filed Apr. 15, 1993).


3. Petitioner contends (Pet. 5) that summary affirmance by the court of appeals was inappropriate. That contention is without merit. The clarity of the parties' positions and the well reasoned opinion of the district court entitled the court of appeals to conclude that no benefit would result from further briefing and argument. The court of appeals' summary action was thus proper. See Taxpayers Watchdog Inc. v Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297-298 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 792, 793-794 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

WILLIAM C. BRYSON
Acting Solicitor General

STUART E. SCHIFFER
Acting Assistant Attorney General

BARBARA C. BIDDLE
DOUGLAS ROSS
Attorneys

APRIL 1993