UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RENAY HUNTER,                )
              Plaintiff,     )
                             )
     v.                      )  Civil Action No. 88-0718-LFO
                             )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,)
              Defendants.    )
_____________________________)

MEMORANDUM

On March 16, 1988, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police officers charging that on November 8, 1986, he was beaten by the officers when they arrested him in connection with a motor vehicle accident. The ocmplaint charges violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, and deprivation of rights guraranteed to plaintiff by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.

A motion to dismiss supported by a well-drafted memorandum persuasively contends that the complaint must be dismissed. As defendants point out, the allegations supporting the section 1981 charge fail to allege any racial motivation. General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). The section 1983 claim, essentially for assault adn battery, was more than one year old when the complaint was filed, and is therefore barred by D.C. Code 12-301 (4) made applicable to section 1983 actions by "borrowing" as contemplated by the decision of the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985). See McClam v. Barry, 697 F.2d 366,

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376 (D.C. Cir 1983); Williams v. District of Columbia, 676 F. Supp. 329 (D.D.C. 1987); cf. Hobson v. Brennan, 625 F. Supp. 459 ((D.D.C. 1985). But cf. Underwood v. District of Columbia Armory Bd., 816 F.2d 769, 773 n.1 (court assumes, without deciding, that three-year statute of limitations applied to plaintiff's claims of employment descrimination).

Plaintiff also invokes 42 U.S.C. 1985 and 1986, which govern conspiracies to deny constitutional rights or failure to report such conspiracy to commit an assault and battery (as distinguished from more subtle deprivations) is only actionable if a complaint is filed within one year. Cf. Hobson v. Brennan, supra. But even if these cahrges were not time barred, the counts alleging them must be dismissed because the complaint alleges the conspiracy in a completely conclusory manner. Indeed there is no allegation of a conspiracy as such, much less a conspiracy to deny plaintiff specific constitutional rights. See Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1118 (1983).

Plaintiff also claims that the alleged assault and battery violated specific constitutional rights. But these alleged violations are actionable, if at all, under section 1983. See Gladden v. Barry, 558 F. Supp. 676, 678 (D.D.C. 1983). Such action is, as indicated, time barred.

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A similar fate precludes plaintiff's common law tort claims; they are also time barred claims for assault adn battery. Moreover the timely notice of the incident which plaintiff's counsel furnished to the District of Columbia failed to give any indication of the site, approximate tiem, or cause of the alleged incident or the circumstances of it. Hence, the common law claim is also precluded by plaintiff's failure to satisfy the requirements of D.C. Code 12-309, a predicate to suit against the District of Columbia for claims against it and its officials. Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C. 1981); Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362 (D.C. 1981).

Accordingly, an accompanying order will grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.

Date: October 26, 1988

Louis F. Orberdorfer (signed)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
RENAY HUNTER,                )
              Plaintiff,     )
                             )
     v.                      )  Civil Action No. 88-0718-LFO
                             )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,)
              Defendants.    )
_____________________________)

ORDER

For reasons stated in the accompanying Memorandum, it is this 26th day of October, 1988 hereby

ORDERED: that defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint shall be, and is hereby, granted; and it is further

ORDERED: that the complaint should be, and is hereby dismissed.

Louis F. Oberdorfer (signed)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE