[15] It is accordingly likely that a classification of the
homeless would be subjected only to a rational basis review,
which the City might well prove in this instance. As the Court
has declined to find suspect classifications on the basis of
either wealth, Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450,
108 S.Ct. 2481, 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988), or housing, Lindsey, 405
U.S. 56, 92 S.Ct. 862, the challenged Program would likely be
tested only against a rational basis. Moreover, the very fact of
a discriminatory purpose may not invalidate a measure otherwise
subject to rational basis review. In Parr, a four-three decision
adjudicating an equal protection claim on federal constitutional
grounds, the dissenting opinion noted: 'the consideration of
motive is complicated by the fact that it is altogether possible
for a law which is the expression of a forbidden motive to be a
good law. What is to
859
be done with a law which, passed with
the most questionable of motives, still makes a positive
contribution to the public good? ...' ... [E]ven if we assume
[the challenged ordinance was motivated by a discriminatory
intent], that ordinance by its terms applies to 'any person'
violating its provisions. In spite of its assuredly improper
motives, it is a 'good law.' 3 Cal.3d at 872, 92 Cal.Rptr. 153,
479 P.2d 353 (Burke, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original;
citations omitted). Because the challenged Program might
therefore be determined to be rationally related to assertedly
legitimate interests of protecting public safety and health, and
preserving parks for their intended purposes, see City's Opp'n at
22, a finding by the Court that plaintiffs had proved a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the equal
protection claim is not proper on this record.
C. Whether the Matrix Program Impermissibly Burdens the Right to
Travel
[16] This argument proffered by plaintiffs is essentially a
subset of equal protection analysis, in which the right to travel
is deemed a fundamental right which a state government may not
abridge unless necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.
See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627-35, 89 S.Ct. 1322,
1328-31, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). The right to travel has found
its strongest expression in the context of attempts by states to
discourage the immigration of indigents. The application of
strict scrutiny to such laws, however, has been limited to those
which are facially discriminatory. See id. (holding
unconstitutional statutory provision requiring welfare assistance
applicants to reside in state at least one year immediately
preceding application for assistance); Edwards v. California,
314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941) (curtailing
immigration of new residents); Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. 250, 94 S.Ct. 1076, 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974)
(denying medical services to new residents).
The Matrix Program does not facially discriminate between those
who are, and those who might be, the City's residents.
Accordingly, the application of strict scrutiny to the Program
would be unwarranted. See City's Opp'n at 20. Again, plaintiffs
cite Pottinger, Huntsville and Tobe in support of their argument;
this Court cannot conclude at this time that each case is
sufficiently persuasive that it should now be followed.
As Huntsville does not even discuss the right to travel, see
Plaintiffs' Mot. at 19-20, it cannot be deemed supporting
authority. Pottinger and Tobe, conversely, address the issue
squarely, but in a manner which is not necessarily persuasive to
the Court. Applying strict scrutiny to the challenged
enforcement efforts, the court in Pottinger found the City's
arrests violative of the right to travel: [E]nforcement of the
challenged ordinances against homeless individuals significantly
burdens their freedom of movement. It has the effect of
preventing homeless people from coming into the City. Primarily,
however, it has the effect of expelling those already present and
of significantly burdening their freedom of movement within the
City and the state. 810 F.Supp. at 1581.
These decisions constitute extensions of the right to travel
which may well be unwarranted under governing Supreme Court
precedent. Initially, to the extent these cases apply strict
scrutiny to facially neutral laws impacting intrastate travel,
they may be wrongly decided. Assuming the right to travel
encompasses protection to intrastate travel, [10] it is
nevertheless doubtful that facially neutral laws impacting
intrastate travel should be subjected to such strict scrutiny.
"Both the United States Supreme Court and [the California Supreme
Court] have refused to apply the strict construction test to
legislation ... which does not penalize travel and
[10 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether the
right to travel includes intrastate travel. See Pottinger 810
F.Supp. at 1579. The Court has suggested, however, that such a
broad reading is permissible. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 355-56, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1857, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983) (law
prohibiting wandering the streets at night without identification
implicated "consideration of the constitutional right to freedom
of movement."). Moreover, the federal circuit courts of appeals
have uniformly held that the right encompasses intrastate travel.
See Plaintiffs' Mot. at 19 n. 10.]
860
resettlement [through disparate treatment] but merely makes it
more difficult for the outsider to establish his residence in the
place of his choosing." Associated Home Builders v. Livermore, 18
Cal.3d 582, 603, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473 (1976). Insofar
as the courts in Pottinger and Tobe invalidate not facially
discriminatory measures, but police efforts adversely impacting
the homeless, those decisions are not sufficiently persuasive to
convince this Court of any likelihood of success on the merits of
the right to travel claim.
D. Whether the Matrix Program Violates Plaintiffs' Rights to Due
Process of Law
Plaintiffs contend the Matrix Program has been enforced in
violation of the due process clauses of the United States and
California Constitutions. Since plaintiffs have not specifically
identified any authority supporting a broader reading of due
process protections on independent state constitutional grounds,
see Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7(a), the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides the appropriate analysis.
Plaintiffs specifically argue that due process has been violated
by employing punitive policing measures against the homeless for
sleeping in public parks; plaintiffs also argue that certain
state codes are unconstitutionally vague.
1. Punishing the Homeless for Sitting or Sleeping in Parks
Plaintiffs claim that San Francisco Park Code section 3.12 has
been applied by police in an unconstitutional manner. That
section provides, No person shall construct or maintain any
building, structure, tent or any other thing in any park that may
be used for housing accommodations or camping, except by
permission from the Recreation and Park Commission. San
Francisco, Cal., Park Code s 3.12 (1981). Plaintiffs contend the
Police Department has impermissibly construed this provision to
justify citing, arresting, threatening and "moving along" those
"persons guilty of nothing more than sitting on park benches with
their personal possessions or lying on or under blankets on the
ground." Plaintiffs' Mot. at 21-22. Plaintiffs have submitted
declarations of various homeless persons supporting the asserted
application of the San Francisco Park Code section. See, e.g.,
Homeless Decls. at 34 (lying down atop blankets eating lunch),
121 ("sleeping on bench"), 125 ("sleeping on boxes").
[17] It appears, if plaintiffs have accurately depicted the
manner in which the section is enforced, that the section may
have been applied to conduct not covered by the section and may
have been enforced unconstitutionally. The City's initial
defense, which is wrongly invoked, is that the defendant to this
action is not an individual officer, but the City itself, which
will not be found liable unless its officers committed an act
pursuant to a "formal policy" or a "longstanding practice or
custom which constitutes the 'standard operating procedure' of
the local governmental entity." Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d
1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1992). The City argues that because its
police officers were continually educated in the proper
enforcement of the camping ordinance, see, e.g., Petrini Decl.,
Exh. A (instructing police officers that "[t]he mere lying or
sleeping on or in a bedroll in and of itself does not constitute
a violation"), plaintiffs would be unable to succeed on the
merits of this claim. This defense misreads governing law.
Where prospective relief only is sought, the Ninth Circuit has
provided that the "official policy or custom requirement" does
not apply. See Chaloux v. Killeen, 886 F.2d 247, 250-51 (9th
Cir.1989); Reply at 27.
[18] Issuance of the remedy sought by plaintiffs would
nevertheless be premature at this stage of the litigation.
Police have been continually and increasingly educated in proper
enforcement of the measures. Moreover, as it appears many of the
alleged violations occurred prior to such instructions, it has
not been sufficiently demonstrated by plaintiffs that the
problematic enforcement continues, such that the continuing
injury predicate to issuance of injunctive relief still exists.
See Pomerantz v. County of Los Angeles, 674 F.2d 1288 (9th
Cir.1982) (finding
861
of mootness generally bars a court from
considering claim for injunctive relief).
2. Overbreadth and Vagueness Challenges to Enforcement Measures
Plaintiffs also contend that San Francisco Park Code section
3.12, discussed supra, and California Penal Code Section 647(i)
[11] are unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. "[A] court's
first task is to determine whether the enactment reaches a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. If it
does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail. The court
should then examine the facial vagueness challenge and, assuming
the enactment implicates no constitutionally protected conduct,
should uphold the challenge only if the enactment is
impermissibly vague in all of its applications.... A court
should therefore examine the complainant's conduct before
analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law." Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95,
102 S.Ct. 1186, 1191, 71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982) (emphasis added;
footnote omitted).
[19] It is unlikely that the overbreadth and vagueness challenges
can be maintained. Overbreadth is a challenge which may be
successfully leveled only where First Amendment concerns are at
stake. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 n. 18, 104 S.Ct.
2403, 2412 n. 18, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984) ("[O]utside the limited
First Amendment context, a criminal statute may not be attacked
as overbroad."). The applicability of the First Amendment to the
present case has not been suggested by any of the parties, nor
would such an argument strike the Court as a meritorious one.
Accordingly, sufficient problems attach to the overbreadth
challenge that it cannot support plaintiffs' request for
injunctive relief.
[20] The possible success of the vagueness challenge is also in
doubt, as it seems readily apparent the measure is not
"impermissibly vague in all of its applications...." Village of
Hoffman Est., 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. at 1191. This likely
failing follows from plaintiffs' inability to prove at this stage
that police have been granted an excess of discretion pursuant to
the statute. Plaintiffs assert vagueness in the San Francisco
Park Code prohibition against maintaining "any other thing" that
"may be used for ... camping", and in enforcing the Penal Code
prohibition against one "who lodges in ... public," Plaintiffs'
Mot. at 23-24, claiming "[t]he vagueness of these [Park Code]
terms has apparently allowed San Francisco police officers to
determine that blankets or possessions in carts are sufficiently
connected to 'camping' to violate the ordinance." Id. at 23.
Plaintiffs have also submitted declarations of homeless persons
supporting these assertions, and a concession by Assistant
District Attorney Paul Cummins to the effect that the standards
for enforcement are vague. See id. at 24.
In consideration of plaintiffs' burden to prove the section
"impermissibly vague in all of its applications," Village of
Hoffman Est., 455 U.S. at 495, 102 S.Ct. at 1191, it is not clear
to the Court that plaintiffs can make this showing with respect
to the challenged ordinance. A decision of persuasive authority
supports this "common-sense understanding of camping." See
United States v. Thomas, 864 F.2d 188, 196 (D.C.Cir.1988)
(upholding camping regulations against vagueness challenge).
Moreover, numerous directives within the Police Department defend
the measures against the charge of problematic enforcement. The
City contends that the Police Department's enforcement memoranda
limit application of the ordinance to situations where the person
has set up living accommodations. See City's Opp'n at 25;
Petrini Decl., Exh. C ("indicia of camping may include the
accoutrements of a campsite, such as cooking utensils, clothing
hung out, groups of sleeping bags and bedding in a cluster,
etc.").
[11 That section provides: Every person who commits any of the
following acts is guilty of disorderly conduct, a misdemeanor:
... Who lodges in any building, structure, vehicle, or place,
whether public or private, without the permission of the owner or
person entitled to the possession or in control thereof. Cal.
Penal Code s 647(i).]
862
Opinion Continued
Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park