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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

BARRY ADAMS,) No. 4:01-cv-295 (BLW)
Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., Defendants.))) REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS') MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE) ALTERNATIVE, FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT))))

In Plaintiff's Response, <u>pro se</u> plaintiff Barry Adams has effectively asked this Court to take jurisdiction over a case outside its Article III jurisdiction, revisit issues previously decided by the Ninth Circuit, and write the signature requirement out of the Forest Service's noncommercial group use regulation. Because the Court does not have the authority to take any of these steps, it should grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment.

I. THE COURT LACKS JURISDICTION BECAUSE ANY CONTROVERSY OVER PLAINTIFF'S PERMIT APPLICATION IS MOOT.

At the outset, it remains clear that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this case. Plaintiff does not dispute that the Rainbow Family gathering in the Boise National Forest for which he sought a permit is over. Because there is no effective relief remaining for the Court to provide, any controversy over the permit application that plaintiff submitted on June 17, 2001 is now moot. See GATX/Airlog Co. v. United States Dist. Ct. for the N. Dist. of Cal., 192 F.3d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir. 1999).

Despite plaintiff's suggestion to the contrary, see Plaintiff's Response at 19 n.31, neither

In his response, plaintiff quotes the standard for determining whether a case has been "mooted by a defendant's voluntary conduct." Plaintiff's Response at 19 (quoting White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1243 (9th Cir. 2000)). However, that standard is inapplicable here because defendants have not argued that their own conduct has rendered this case moot; instead, the instant controversy has been mooted by the undisputed completion of the Rainbow Family gathering in the Boise National Forest.

Likewise, the citation in Plaintiff's Response to a Ninth Circuit decision discussing ripeness is beside the point, as defendants have argued that the controversy over plaintiff's June 17, 2001 permit application is moot, not unripe. See Plaintiff's Response at 14 (citing Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1078 (2001)). Any claim regarding a hypothetical future permit application would of course be unripe, but even liberally construed plaintiff's complaint does not raise such a claim.

of the conditions required for the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the mootness doctrine is met here. See In re Di Giorgio, 134 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir. 1998). First, there is no "reasonable expectation" that plaintiff will be subject to the same alleged "injury" in the future. Id. Quite the contrary, Jeff Kline or someone else may well agree to sign a permit as an agent for the group at future Rainbow Family gatherings even if plaintiff remains unwilling to do so, thereby obviating any future controversy over the signature requirement.

Second, any alleged injury is not "so inherently limited in duration that the action will become most before the completion of appellate review." Id. In his response, plaintiff does not point to any factor that would prevent him from submitting any future permit application well in advance of the proposed gathering date. Indeed, the noncommercial group use regulation directs groups "to contact the Forest Service . . . as early as possible in advance of the proposed use," 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(a), and requires the Forest Service to act on applications within forty-eight hours of receipt, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(3)(i). There is therefore no inherent reason why plaintiff could not obtain appellate review of any future permit denial before the controversy became moot. Plaintiff has only himself and the Rainbow Family to blame for the fact that the instant controversy became moot before appellate review was available, since he waited until the gathering was already underway to submit a permit application, in direct violation of the regulation. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(a) (requiring contact "as early as possible in advance of the proposed use"); 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(2)(iv) ("Applications for noncommercial group uses must be received at least 72 hours in advance of the proposed activity."); Complaint, Attachment 4 (listing June 15, 2001 as the starting date for the gathering). In short, this is simply not an "exceptional situation[]" where the capable-of-repetition-yet-evading-review exception to the

mootness doctrine would apply. <u>Unabom Trial Media Coalition v. United States Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Cal.</u>, 183 F.3d 949, 950 (9th Cir. 1999).

- II. IF THE CONTROVERSY WERE NOT MOOT, PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL AS A MATTER OF LAW.
 - A. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW THAT THE FOREST SERVICE FOLLOWED ITS REGULATION IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S PERMIT APPLICATION.

Plaintiff's complaint and its attachments make it clear that: (1) plaintiff submitted an application for a noncommercial group use permit by letter dated June 17, 2001, see Complaint, Attachment 6; (2) plaintiff's application did not specify the name, address, and day and evening telephone numbers of a person who would sign the special use permit on behalf of the group, see id.; and (3) the Forest Service denied this application by letter dated June 18, 2001 because plaintiff had failed to specify the name, address, and day and evening telephone numbers of a person who would sign the special use permit on behalf of the group, see Complaint ¶ 10-12; Complaint, Attachment 1. Because denial of the permit application was required by the noncommercial group use regulation, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(d)(2)(i)(E); 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(3)(ii)(H), defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted if jurisdiction is found.

In the alternative, defendants have moved for summary judgment and have submitted a statement of undisputed material facts and the Declaration of Walter B. Rogers dated June 28, 2001 in support.² In Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Material Facts, plaintiff takes issue with

² Defendants are also submitting a Supplemental Declaration of Walter B. Rogers dated September 25, 2001 as Exhibit 1 to this brief. The supplemental declaration clarifies statements made in Mr. Rogers's earlier declaration regarding the timing of communications with Jeff

only one of the material facts identified in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, i.e., the fact that the Forest Service denied his application by letter dated June 18, 2001. See Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts at ¶ 3; Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Material Facts at ¶ 2.³ However, plaintiff's position that the June 18, 2001 letter was not a denial but merely a request for more information is untenable. There can be no genuine issue as to this material fact because the letter (Attachment 1 to plaintiff's complaint) speaks for itself and is clearly a denial. It indicates in no uncertain terms that the application is "incomplete" because plaintiff failed to provide the "[n]ame address, day and evening phone numbers of person(s) who will sign a Special Use Permit on behalf of the group." See Complaint, Attachment 1.

Additionally, none of the attachments to Plaintiff's Responses raises a genuine issue of material fact. Neither the declaration of Electric Ed Tunis nor any of the other attachments casts any doubt upon, or is in any way relevant to, the material facts identified in Defendants'

Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.⁴ Accordingly, if the complaint is not dismissed for lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, summary judgment should be entered in defendants'

Kline, but is not relevant to any of the material facts identified in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.

³ Although Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Material Facts contains a number of other assertions, they do not contradict any of the material facts identified in Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts.

⁴ In addition, the newspaper articles submitted as Attachments Λ and B to Plaintiff's Response are inadmissible hearsay and therefore should not be considered by the Court on summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding newspaper account inadmissible on summary judgment as hearsay or hearsay within hearsay); Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 641-44 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding newspaper quotations inadmissible on hearsay grounds).

favor.

B. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENTS MUST BE REJECTED.

1. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO STATE ANY CLAIM IN THE "EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS" SECTION OF HIS BRIEF.

The arguments under the heading "Equal Protection, Due Process" in Plaintiff's Response are meritless. See Plaintiff's Response at 7-9. Plaintiff's complaint raises only a First Amendment claim, and, even in Plaintiff's Response, plaintiff does not explain how defendants' application of the noncommercial group use regulation violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause, or his asserted right to a fair hearing or to petition a court, see id.5

Additionally, the arguments that plaintiff does develop under the heading "Equal Protection, Due Process" must be swiftly rejected. Plaintiff's contentions that he is not a member of the Rainbow Family and that the Rainbow Family is not a "group" are foreclosed by Ninth Circuit precedent. In Black v. Arthur, 201 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit expressly ruled that plaintiff and the other appellants are "members of the Rainbow Family" and that "Rainbow Family gatherings constitute... a group use because they involve gatherings of 75 or more people." Id. at 1122. Both law of the circuit and collateral estoppel thus bar plaintiff from

⁵ Although plaintiff has not raised a claim under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq., he mistakenly invokes its standard in discussing his claims. See Plaintiff's Response at 17. Even if plaintiff had asserted a RFRA claim, the noncommercial group use regulation could not be said to run afoul of the statute because the regulation does not impose a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion, and, in any event, is the least restrictive means of furthering compelling governmental interests, including the protection of forest resources and facilities, the promotion of public health and safety, and the allocation of space within the National Forest System. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.; USDA, Final Rule, Land Uses & Prohibitions, 60 Fed. Reg. 45258, 45260, 45262, 45267 (Aug. 30, 1995).

denying that he is a member of the Rainbow Family or that the Rainbow Family is a "group" within the meaning of the noncommercial group use regulation.

Plaintiff's contention that he submitted his June 17, 2001 application as "an individual 'proponent' signing on his own behalf" is similarly flawed. Plaintiff's Response at 7; see also id. at 2 & n.4. If one individual wishes to use National Forest System lands alone in a noncommercial fashion, there is no permit requirement. It therefore makes no sense to speak of an "individual 'proponent' signing on his own behalf" for a noncommercial group use permit. Such permits are only required for – and available to – groups involving 75 or more spectators or participants. See 36 C.F.R. § 251.50(c)(3); 36 C.F.R. § 251.51 (defining "Group use"). Thus, if plaintiff or anyone else wants to engage in a noncommercial use of National Forest System lands with a group of 75 or more people, he must ensure that an application is filed on behalf of the group and that an individual is identified who will sign the permit on behalf of the group.

Here, there is no question that plaintiff submitted his June 17, 2001 application on behalf of a group because he identified "Individuals attending 2001 Rainbow Gathering" as the "Name of Group" in the section of his application captioned "APPLICANT INFORMATION" and estimated that there would be "over 75" and "perhaps 20,000 or more" participants. See Complaint, Attachment 6. Plaintiff failed, however, to identify an individual who would sign the permit on behalf of the group, see id., as required by the regulation, see 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(d)(2)(i)(E); 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(3)(ii)(H). Courts have repeatedly upheld the regulation's signature requirement and have made clear that the signature is to be made on behalf of the group. See United States v. Kalb, 234 F.3d 827, 832-33 & n.6 (3d Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, 69 U.S.L.W. 3620 (U.S. Mar. 12, 2001); United States v. Masel, 54 F. Supp. 2d 903,

919 (W.D. Wisc. 1999), aff'd, No. 98-10014-X-01 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2000). After upholding the signature requirement in Black v. Arthur, for example, the Ninth Circuit explained that "[a]n individual who signs a permit under the regulation does so as an agent for the group." 201 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Because plaintiff failed to identify an individual who would sign on the group's behalf pursuant to this valid regulatory requirement, his application was properly denied as incomplete.

2. WAIVING THE SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A VALID ALTERNATIVE TIME, PLACE, OR MANNER UNDER THE NONCOMMERCIAL GROUP USE REGULATION.

Plaintiff's assertion that the Forest Service should have waived the signature requirement as a valid alternative time, place, or manner is also without merit. See Plaintiff's Response at 9-11. As noted in defendants' opening memorandum, the Forest Service is required to provide an alternative only if the "alternative time, place, or manner will allow the applicant to meet the [regulation's] eight evaluation criteria." 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(3)(iii). There was simply no alternative that defendants could offer that would have rectified plaintiff's failure to provide the name of a person who would sign the special use authorization on behalf of the group. Indeed,

⁶ In <u>Kalb</u>, the Third Circuit also expressly rejected the legal impossibility argument to which plaintiff alludes on the ground that attendees at a Rainbow Family gathering could have designated persons to sign a permit on behalf of the group without breaking any laws. <u>See</u> 234 F.3d at 833 n.6; <u>see also</u> Plaintiff's Response at 7, 8.

⁷ The testimony from <u>United States v. Adams</u>, Nos. CR-01-011-GF-DWM, CR00-5037-GF-RFC (D. Mont. Feb. 5, 2001), that plaintiff quotes is not to the contrary. District Ranger David Havig merely indicated that he has at times requested additional information from applicants who have submitted incomplete applications for special use permits. <u>See Plaintiff's Response</u>, Attachment G, at 108-09. However, nothing in the regulation requires the Forest Service to seek additional information before deciding whether to grant or deny an application. Likewise, nothing in the regulation requires the Forest Service to issue a permit where an

no legally effective permit can issue without a signature on behalf of the group. See Kalb, 234 F.3d at 833 ("[R]equiring an individual to sign a special use authorization as a representative of the group is necessary . . . to give the authorization legal effect . . . ") (quoting Masel, 54 F. Supp. 2d at 919); see also USDA, Final Rule, Land Uses & Prohibitions, 60 Fed. Reg. 45258, 45274, 45286 (Aug. 30, 1995) ("The signature gives the authorization legal effect. . . . By signing a special use authorization on behalf of the group, the agent or representative gives the authorization legal effect and subjects the group to the authorization's terms and conditions.").8

The fact that plaintiff submitted information in his June 17, 2001 application under the twin headings "FS-2700-3b" and "FS-2700-3c" in no way alters this analysis. See Complaint, Attachment 6. Under both headings, plaintiff failed to provide the name of a person who would sign a special use authorization on behalf of the group. Because the information under the two headings related to the same proposed gathering and was provided in one written submission, the Forest Service properly treated plaintiff's June 17, 2001 letter as one application for a noncommercial group use permit, and denied it because the information provided did not include the name and contact information of an individual who would sign a special use authorization on behalf of the group. See Complaint, Attachment 1.9

application is incomplete. To the contrary, the regulation requires certain limited information to be submitted that is necessary for application of the eight evaluation criteria.

⁸ Consistent with this authority, the permit forms that plaintiff has submitted as attachments to his response explicitly state that a person who signs the permit as an agent of the holder does so "to give the permit legal effect." Plaintiff's Response, Attachment D, ¶ 11, & Attachment F, ¶ 11.

⁹ Additionally, as explained on page 5 of defendants' opening memorandum, plaintiff's letter dated June 15, 2001 was not an application.

C. THE NONCOMMERCIAL GROUP USE REGULATION PRECLUDES, RATHER THAN ALLOWS FOR, A HECKLER'S VETO OR VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION.

Plaintiff's arguments regarding an alleged heckler's veto and viewpoint discrimination should be summarily rejected. See Plaintiff's Response at 11-14. There are absolutely no factual allegations to support plaintiff's claim that the Forest Service has permitted a "heckler's veto" or regulated speech on the basis of the substantive viewpoint conveyed. Indeed, the noncommercial group use regulation that the Forest Service properly applied to plaintiff's application expressly prohibits the Forest Service from considering "concerns about possible reaction to the users' identities or beliefs from non-members of the group" in assessing whether "[t]he proposed activity will . . . pose a substantial danger to public safety." 36 C.F.R. § 251.54(g)(3)(ii)(F). Additionally, the fact that the Forest Service distinguishes between applications that identify a person who will sign a special use permit on behalf of the group and those that do not is categorically not a form of viewpoint discrimination; instead, it is the proper application of the regulatory signature requirement upheld in Black v. Arthur, 201 F.3d at 1122-23.

III. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, and those set forth in defendants' opening memorandum, this Court should dismiss plaintiff's action or grant defendants summary judgment.

Likewise, plaintiff has made no showing that he was discriminated against in violation of the USDA anti-discrimination policy that he cites. <u>See</u> Plaintiff's Response at 18 n.29.

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September 25, 2001

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ROBERT D. MCCALLUM, JR. Assistant Attorney General THOMAS E. MOSS Interim United States Attorney ALAN BURROW Assistant United States Attorney THOMAS W. MILLET AMANDA QUESTER United States Department of Justice Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch P.O. Box 883 Washington, D.C. 20044 Telephone: (202) 514-3489 Facsimile: (202) 616-8202 Attorneys for the Federal Defendants IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO BARRY ADAMS, Plaintiff, No. CIV 01-0295-6-BLW ٧. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. SUPPLEMENTAL DECLARATION OF WALTER B. ROGERS I, Walter B. Rogers, District Ranger, Lowman Ranger District, Boise National Forest, USDA, Forest Service, declare that:

1. In ¶ 13 of my declaration dated June 28, 2001, I stated that I sent Jeff Kline a letter denying his second application before 3:25 p.m. When I made that declaration, I was relying on what my watch said when I sent the letter by fax to Mr. Kline. I try to keep my watch accurate to within a minute or so of the correct time. I have never been involved, however, in setting the time on the Lowman Ranger District's fax machine.

2. Since executing my June 28, 2001 declaration, I have reviewed two journals that were created by our fax machine on June 25, 2001, as well as the user's guide for the fax machine. The journals and several pages from the user's guide are Attachments A and B to this supplemental declaration. The journals indicate that on June 23, 2001 a communication from Mr. Kline's number started at 15:25 (3:25 p.m.) and lasted 2 minutes and 38 seconds. This communication was Mr. Kline's application of June 23, 2001. The journals also indicate that on June 25, 2001 our fax machine started a communication to Mr. Kline's number at 15:26 (3:26 p.m.). That communication was my letter of June 25, 2001 denying Mr. Kline's application of June 23, 2001.

I declare under penalty of perjury in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 that the above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on 25 September 2001.

WALTER B. ROGERS

District Ranger, Lowman Ranger District

Boise National Forest USDA, Forest Service

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-LOWMAN RANGER STATION

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
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Facsimile

Panafax_® UF-585/595 User's Guide



Sample Transaction Journal

(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11) (12)
NO.	COMM.		FILE	DURATION	X/R	identification	DATE	TIME	DIAGNOSTIC
01	ок	005/005	001	00:00:22	XMT	SERVICE DEPT.	MAR-11	17:35	C0044903C0000
02	OK	003	002	00:01:17	RCV	111 222 333	MAR-11	17:41	C0044903C0000
03	OK	001	003	00:00:31	TMX	ACCOUNTING DEPT.	MAR-11	17:50	C0044903C0000
04	630	000/005	004	00:00:00	XMT	☎ 342345676	MAR-11	17:57	0800420000000
05	STOP	000	005	00:00:34	XMT	± 12324567	MAR-11	18:35	0210260200000
06	OK	001/001	006	00:00:20	XMT	44 567345	MAR-11	18:44	C8044B03C0000
07	408	*003	007	00:02:14	XMT	☎ 2345678	MAR-11	18:55	0040440A30080
(\		\		\	\		
31	OK	002/002	050	00:00:31	хмт	☎ 0245674533	MAR-12	08:35	C8044B03C1000
32	OΚ	003/003	051	00:01:32	XMT	# 0353678980	MAR-12	08:57	C8044B03C1000
						(13) -PAN	ASONIC		-

Sample Individual Transmission Journal (IND. XMT JOURNAL)

*****	*** - IND. XMT JO	OURNAL- **********	(1) DATE MAR-12-1999	(2) ***** TIME 15:00	*****
(10) (11)	DATE/TIME	= MAR-12-1999 09:00			
(3)	JOURNAL No.	= 21			
(4)	COMM. RESULT	= OK			
(5)	PAGE(S)	= 001			
(7)	puration	- 00:00:16			
(6)	FILE No.	= 010			
(16)	морк	■ TRANSMISSION			
(17)	DESTINATION	+ [001] / 555 1234 /ABCD	EFG		
(18)	RECEIVED ID	-			
(19)	RESOLUTIÓN	= STD			
			3) ANASONIC	-	
*******	*****	****-HEAD OFFICE -*** (15)	****- 201 (14)	555 1212- ******	********

▶Journals and Lists

Explanation of contents

- (1) Printout date
- (2) Printout time
- (3) Journal number

(4) Communication result

: "OK" indicates that the communication was successful.

"BUSY" indicates that the communication has failed because of busy line.

"STOP" indicates that STOP was pressed during communication.

"M-OK" indicates that the substitute reception message in memory was not

printed out.

"P-OK" indicates that memory overflow or document misfeeding occurred while storing the documents into memory for transmission but successfully stored

document(s) was sent.

"R-OK" Indicates that the Relayed XMT or Confidential Communication was

successful.

"3-digit Info Code" (See page 140) indicates that the communication has failed.

(5) Number of pages transmitted or received

: The 3-digit number is the number of pages successfully transmitted or received. When the documents are stored into memory, two 3-digit numbers will appear. The first 3-digit number represents the number of pages successfully transmitted. The second 3-digit number represents the total number of pages that were attempted to be transmitted.

Asterisk "*" indicates that the quality of some received copies was poor.

(6) File number

: 001 to 999 (If the communication is stored into memory, a file number is assigned for each communication.)

(7) Duration of communication

(8) Type of communication

: "XMT" means Transmission
"RCV" means Reception
"POL" means Polling
"PLD" means Polled
"FWD" means Fax Forward

(9) Remote station identification

: Name : Recorded name in One-Touch or ABBR Numbers or remote station's

Character ID.

number : Dialed telephone number.
 Number : Remote station's ID number.

(10) Communication date

(11) Communication Start time

(12) Diagnostic

; For service personnel only

(13) Own LOGO

: Up to 25 characters

(14) Own ID number

: Up to 20 digits

(15) Own Character ID

: Up to 16 characters

(16) Type of communication

: Transmission or memory transmission

(17) Destination

: If a One-Touch or ABBR was used for the transmission: One-Touch or ABBR No./Telephone Number/Recorded Name

If not : Telephone number

(18) Received remote station's ID

: Character ID or ID number

(19) Resolution

: "STD" means standard resolution "FINE" means fine resolution

"S-FINE" means super fine resolution