functions. Kartseva v. Department of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1530 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Hunter v. District of Columbia, 943 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In Harlow v. Fitzserald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Supreme Court held that such officials may be entitled to qualified immunity from civil suit damages for the purpose of shielding them from "undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. " Id. at 806. An official is entitled to qualified immunity if his or her conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. " Zd. at 818. Thus, breaking down Harlow's qualified immunity test into its components, the Plaintiffs must show that: (1) a clearly established right is at issue; and (2) the Defendants' actions in relation to that right were unreasonable. See Anderson v. Creishton, 483 U.S. 635, 645 (1987); Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 190 (1984) ("Even defendants who violate constitutional rights enjoy a qualified immunity . . . unless it is further demonstrated that their conduct was unreasonable ..").
O'Neill allegedly asked the Plaintiff whether Concepcion Picciotto's bicycle in the Park was registered. Declaration of William Thomas at n 6. The Plaintiff told the Officer to "climb a flagpole," at which point the Officer allegedly arrested the Plaintiff for disorderly conduct. Id.
(1987)). In the case at bar, the Plaintiffs have not alleged with specificity facts showing that Officer O'Neill acted unreasonably when he arrested Plaintiff William Thomas, nor have the Plaintiffs claimed that Officer O'Neill acted in bad faith. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978) (holding that qualified immunity does not apply where an officer acts in bad faith). Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant O'Neill is entitled to qualified immunity with regard to his arrest of Plaintiff William Thomas for disorderly conduct.
7.96(g)(5)(x)(A)(4) . The Plaintiffs have not asserted that their sign did not fall within either of these statutory bans. Thus, given the Officers' plain statutory authority for warning the Plaintiffs regarding the use of their sign in the Park, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not established that a clear right was implicated by the Officers' actions, nor have the Plaintiffs shown with sufficient specificity that the Officers acted unreasonably in this respect. Therefore, the Court holds that the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity regarding this factual claim.
Defendants point out, 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g)(5)(x)(A) (4) prohibits the placement or use of "structures" in the Park, including "crates," "boxes or other enclosures," and "similar types of property which might tend to harm park resources including aesthetic interests." 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) (5)(x)(A)(4). The Court finds that the Officers could reasonably interpret these provisions of the regulation as encompassing the cooler possessed by the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court holds that the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this factual allegation.
have not specified that they were engaged in expressive activities at the time of the Officers' alleged actions. Indeed, it is notable that while other portions of the Plaintiff's Complaint are very fact specific, see, e.s., Part IV, infra, the Plaintiffs do not describe with any specificity what activities they were engaged in when the Officers cited them with violating the camping provisions in 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(i).
have overcome the Defendants' claim of qualified immunity. First, the Plaintiffs have established that a clearly established right is implicated by the Defendants' actions. It is beyond doubt in this Nation's jurisprudence that nonspeech conduct sometimes qualifies as expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. Tinker v De Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). Plainly, the alleged coercion of the Plaintiffs not to display their flags in the case at bar involves such protected nonspeech conduct, See Strombera v. California, 28j U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931) (striking down prohibition on display of red flags as an emblem of "opposition to organized government"); Milwavkee Mobilization for Survival v. Milwaukee City Park Comm'n, 477 F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (striking down prohibition on display of flags without written permission of a Park Commission).
not restrict the use of portable signs or banners," a category which appears to encompass the Plaintiffs' flags. 36 C.F.R. § 7.96(g) (vii)(E). Perhaps the Defendants have in mind section 7.96(g) (x) (B), which places size restrictions on stationary signs. In that case, it is unclear whether this provision even applies to flags. Assuming arguendo that the sign-size limits do apply, the Court finds that the Defendants have not provided sufficient evidence that the Plaintiffs' flags actually exceeded these size limitations, The Defendants only "proof" supporting this proposition is Judge Green's Order referred to above. However, the Order does not make a finding of fact that the present Plaintiffs' flags were too large. Instead, Judge Green notes only that the "defendants contend that the flags were seized because they were affixed to signs~ that were too large. Order, Oct. 12, 1990, Civ. No. 88-3130, p. 1 (emphasis supplied) .  Such bare-bones allegations do not suffice to contradict the specific factual allegations presented in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.
[7 The lack of regulatory authority upon which the Officers could rely regarding the flags renders this factual allegation quite distinct from the other four. In those allegations, the Officers' actions reasonably related to enforcing specifically applicable regulatory provisions. See, e.g., Part III-B (noting that specific provisions of 36 C.F.R. Sec. 7.96 et seq. govern display of signs in the Park) . No such regulatory authority exists regarding the present allegation.]
for the flags, and in light of the silence of section 7.96 regarding any permissible regulation of flags by Park Police, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have met their burden of presenting preliminary allegations that a clearly established right is at issue and that the Defendants allegedly acted unreasonably in relation to that right. Consequently, the Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity with respect to this factual allegation by the Plaintiffs.