Nor does plaintiff contest the presumption that reasonable concerns over
"protection of the President from explosive devices carried by vehicles" might justify
the closing of Pennsylvania Avenue "to vehicular traffic." Tr. pgs 10, 11; Am. Com.
¶¶ 14, 18. Plaintiff merely questions whether a well intentioned concern for
presidential security, or the orderly procession of emergency vehicles, can excuse
dispensing with due process, a concept well established from the inception of this
nation, to check and balance the various branches of government, as a safeguard to
2
the essential ideals upon which the nation was founded, leading plaintiff to recall the
words of Justice Louis Brandeis,
"the gravest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men (and
women) of zeal, well-intentioned, but without understanding."
Piddling as the details of the instant complaint may seem to them, counsel
apparently fail to understand that under the First Amendment these details are of
paramount significance. See, infra, Bivens and Constitutional Claims.
"The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is ...
one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart form totalitarian regimes."
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 4 (1945); see also, United States v. Eichman
58 LW 4745 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989); Boos v. Barry,
485 U.S. 312 (1989); Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus 482 U.S. 203
(1986); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 US l3l (l96l); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 411 (1969); Tinker v. Des Moines,
393 U.S. 503; United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 368 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615; United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 177; Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, (1980); Gregory
v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, (1969); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Thornbill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Am. Com. pg. 12.
III. DISCUSSION
As discussed below, plaintiff believes the Federal Rules entitle him to a trial by
jury to determine whether defendant Radzilowski had any reasonable basis to believe
that plaintiff's sign raised a valid concern for presidential security, or the orderly
procession of emergency vehicles, and, if the facts show defendant had no valid
grounds to order the removal of plaintiff's sign, that this Court must fashion the
appropriate legal protection necessary to check and balance defendants' awesome
power, and sheild individual free thought and expression, well established from the
inception of this nation, as essential ideals upon which the nation was founded.
3
On the other hand, defendants argue, plaintiff has "ample alternatives." In
support of this, with all due respect, meaningless suggestion, defendants rely heavily
on a case the Court was faced with a very different situation,
" The issue for decision on th(at) appeal (wa)s not factual, it (wa)s legal: did the
(agency) draft regulations that were 'narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest'."? White House Vigil for ERA v. Clark, 746 F.2d 1518,
1529. Infra, Fool for a Lawyer?
Conversely, the issues here are factual rather than legal. Factually, the issues
at bar are simpler than defendants' pleadings might lead one to believe. For example:
On May 26th, 1995, would the position of plaintiff's sign (or "structure," as defendants
sometimes like to call it) have caused a reasonable person to view it as a threat to the
free world, the president, or any other legitimate government interest? Was plaintiff's
sign so "large and heavy" that a rational person might view it as a potential obstruction
to emergency vehicles? How many minutes transpired between the moment that
defendant Radzilowski decided to sterilize the area, and the time that plaintiff was in a
paddy wagon, and his sign had been moved to a location just "a few feet away"?
Was the sign any less of an obstruction after defendant moved it? Did plaintiff's arrest
disrupt his expressive activities?