Watt v. CCNV

615

improperly expanding or contracting the scope of that interest. Two cautions are necessary. We should look to the regulations as applied to this case to determine the relevant class of activities that the government is interested in banning. [43] But we should not, in judging the substantiality of the interest underlying that ban, limit our consideration to the harms that might be caused by a particular sub-class of persons, such as appellants, desiring to perform those activities. In other words, we look to the overall benefit to be had from the general application of the regulations, but our understanding of the "regulations" is refined by reference to the activities in which appellants actually propose to engage. Some of our colleagues seem to feel that in judging the substantiality of the government's interest the proper focus in this case is on the incidental harm that would be caused by allowing these appellants to sleep in the park as part of their proposed demonstration. They are mesmerized by the following scenario: the Park Service has already issued a demonstration permit that will allow appellants to construct a "symbolic city" and to maintain a round-the-clock presence at the site. Appellants may put up tents. They can place within those tents sleeping bags, cots, and other bedding materials. They can sit in the tents twenty-four hours a day. They can even lie down, close their eyes and feign sleep. The only thing they cannot do is actually fall asleep. What additional harm to the parks could possibly be caused by allowing appellants actually to sleep rather than merely feigning sleep?

This approach to the question at issue here misconceives the relevant First Amendment inquiry. The apparent absence of harm that would be caused by granting these appellants an exemption from the noncamping regulations may indicate that we should look for a possible, less restrictive alternative to the present regulations. It does not, however, in any way undermine the substantiality of the interest supporting the regulations as now written and applied generally by the Park Service. The Supreme Court has stated explicitly that in judging the substantiality of the government's interest we must look to the interest supporting the law generally, not the interest to be served by applying it in any particular case. The alternative is to nickel and dime every regulation to death.

The point was made most clearly and emphatically in the recent case of Heffron v. Intl Soc. for Krishna Consc. [44] In that case a rule of the Minnesota Agricultural Society, a public corporation that operates the annual state fair, required all persons, groups or firms desiring to sell, exhibit, or distribute materials during the fair to do so only from fixed locations. The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc (ISKCON) claimed the rule violated their First Amendment rights because it suppressed the practice of Sankirtan, a religious ritual that enjoins its members to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion. The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed.

The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the state's interest in the orderly movement of a large crowd and in avoiding congestion was substantial and that rule 6.05 furthered that interest significantly. Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the case did not turn on the "importance of the state's undeniable interest in preventing the widespread disorder that would surely exist if no regulation such as rule 6.05 were in effect" but upon the significance of the state's interest in avoiding whatever disorder would likely result from granting members of ISKCON an exemption


[43 The absurdities to which an alternative approach could lead are readily apparent. The Government could make any regulation invincible by tacking on a prohibition that is undoubtedly supported by a substantial interest but has nothing to do with the usual application of the regulation, such as "Camping and the detonation of hand grenades is forbidden in the parks of the Memorial core area."]

[44 452 U.S. 640, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981).]

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from the rule. Approaching the case in this way, the court concluded that although some disruption would occur from such an exemption, it was not of sufficient concern to warrantconfining the Krishnas to a booth. [45]

The United States Supreme Court, applying free speech (not freedom of religion) principles, [46] rejected this approach and upheld the Rule. "The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON. [47]

A similar mistake would be to focus our attention at this time solely on the harm that would be caused by allowing "First Amendment" camping (ie., camping by any group, not just appellants, for whom the camping was an integral part of the message to be conveyed). Again, such an inquiry might indicate that we should look for a possible, less restrictive alternative to the present regulations. But it bears no relevance to the initial question of whether the regulations as now written and applied are supported by a substantial interest. Thus, in United States v. O'Brien,[48] the court focused on the government's interest generally in preventing the destruction or mutilization of registration certificates, whether or not that destruction or mutilization is for a First Amendment purpose. Again, any other approach would nickel and dime every regulation to death.

Thus, in the instant case, we must not measure the substantiality of the governmental interest by looking solely to the harm that might be caused by allowing these particular appellants to sleep in the park. Nor may we measure that interest by looking only to the harm that would be caused by allowing "First Amendment" camping. Rather, we must look to the interest in preventing camping by all classes of persons, whatever their motive.

Having fixed the relevant class of persons by reference to whom the interest in banning camping should be judged, we must still be very careful in stating what we mean by "camping." In this sense, the claims of these particular appellants are relevant. They do not propose to build fires, dig latrines, cook, etc. They propose only to erect tents, lay out bedding materials, and sleep through the nights for an extended period. Thus, we must judge the substantiality of the government's interest in preventing this class of activities. We do not add cooking, building fires, and digging latrines as make-weights because, even though they are forbidden by the regulations, appellants disclaim any intention of such activity.

The point made above is merely that we should not limit our consideration to a subclass of persons desiring to perform these activities, such as appellants alone or, even, all those with a First Amendment purpose. But we must and do limit our attention to the class of activities actually called into question by this case. Thus, "camping" as used in the remainder of this opinion is limited to such activities as erecting tents or other structures, laying out blankets, sleeping bags, and other bedding materials, and sleeping.

The governmental interest called into question by this case is the prevention of harm that would be caused by camping, in the above sense, in the Memorial core area parks. However, a round-the-clock presence and the erection of symbolic structures, including tents, is allowed by the regulations in conjunction with a demonstration. Thus, the governmental interest is limited to the incremental harm which would be caused by permitting camping generally (i.e.., not just for First Amendment purposes) in addition to the erection of tents and a 24-hour presence for demonstration purposes. [49]


[45 Id. at 651-52, 101 S.Ct. at 2566-2567. ]

[46 Id. at 652-53, 101 S.Ct. at 2566-2568. ]

[47 Id. at 652, 101 S.Ct. at2566. ]

[48 391 U.S. at 378-82. 88 S.Ct. at 1679-1681.]

[49 Judge Edwards suggests that "the only matter in dispute is sleeping." since "the Park Service has not sought to ban the appellants From erecting tents, laying out blankets or bedding, or even maintaining a 24-hour presence." Edwards Op. at n.l. See also id. at 603. We think this is an unduly narrow characterization of what is at stake in this case. The regulations permit a round-the-clock presence and the erection of symbolic structures, including tents, for demonstration purposes. They do not permit a 24-hour presence or the erection of any structures for purposes of living accommodation. As we explain below, see Section III(B)(3), the only way the Park Service can maintain this distinction is by refusing to allow demonstrators to sleep in addition to their other activities. It is sleep that would provide the incentive for nondemonstrators and, perhaps. many demonstrators to erect structures and remain through the night. Unused tents and a nighttime vigil will only be employed for purposes of expression. If the convenience of sleep were added, the Park Service would be unable to distinguish between the symbolic and non-symbolic use of structures and nighttime vigils. Thus, the broader regulatory scheme, which forbids nondemonstrators to erect structures and remain round-the-clock as well as forbids all persons to sleep, is at stake in this case. We will, therefore, continue to speak of "camping," and not merely "sleeping."]

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Even as so stated, however, the substantiality of the governmental interest cannot be doubted. The proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back" is a valid and useful concept. The Park Service may in all good faith strive to be lenient, but nevertheless it is entitled to draw the line somewhere. If camping, whatever the purpose, were allowed in the parks of the Memorial core area, those parks would be overrun by camping during the summer months--the grass would be ruined, litter and human waste would abound, and the pleasure noncampers take in those parks would be ruined.

No such consequences can be anticipated from allowing symbolic structures and a 24-hour presence in the parks. Citizens are only likely to avail themselves of the latter privileges in order to express themselves on pressing issues, whereas camping would be useful to any tourist or visitor interested in minimizing expenses. Furthermore, the potential harm to the parks from persons who actually live there for their own convenience, persons who don't go home to eat, to wash, to sleep, to answer nature's call, etc., exceeds that to be expected from persons erecting symbolic structures or maintaining a wakeful vigil for First Amendment purposes.

It is important once again to recall that we are not yet concerned with the possibility of a less restrictive alternative that would permit First Amendment camping, while denying permission to all other campers. The regulations as written ban all camping, and it is the interest underlying that ban that we must now weigh. As the Park Service has noted, the parks in the Memorial core area, including the Mall and Lafayette Park, are simply unsuited for camping. [50] To permit camping would deprive other groups of the right to use nationally significant space. It would cause significant damage to park resources and a substantial increase in costs for park restoration, sanitary facilities, and extra park personnel. [51] Accordingly, the governmental interest supporting the ban on camping and the erection of structures for living accommodation is substantial.

2. Incidental Infringement on Speech

In most of the symbolic speech cases, the activity that the government attempted to suppress was inherently expressive. Ninety-nine out of a hundred people who purposely burn their draft cards, [52] wear arm bands, [53] or superimpose a peace symbol on the flag, [54] will do so in order to express something thereby. Thus, a prohibition of that activity can have a substantial, even if incidental, impact on speech.

Camping as symbolic speech presents a very different case. Camping in the park has a great deal of independent signifi-


[50 47 Fed.Reg. at 24,301.]

[51 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 6]

[52 See. e.g., United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367. 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968).]

[53 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969).]

[54 Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 94 S.Ct 2727, 41 L.Ed.2d 842 (1974) (per curiam).]

618

cance. It is not a traditional form of speech. It has expressive First Amendment value only in a very limited set of circumstances. Thus, if camping in the Memorial core area parks were permitted, the vast majority of those availing themselves of the privilege would not be intending to express anything thereby. Conversely, the incidental infringement on speech caused by an absolute ban on camping in these areas is simply not that great relative to the government's interest in preventing camping generally. [55]

Appellants may well have hit upon the most expressive means of conveying their message. But they have also stated explicitly that their desire to camp in the parks is based not just on the expressive nature of those activities under the peculiar facts of this case, but also on the fact that camping would facilitate the expression both by attracting demonstrators and by capturing media attention. On the former point, appellants' original application is clear. "Without the incentive of sleeping space or a hot meal, the homeless would not come to the site. [56] This statement is constantly echoed in the papers filed with this court. [57] The latter point follows from the former. Without homeless people coming to demonstrate the poignancy of their plight, the media value of the message is sadly diminished, despite the unabated poignancy of that plight. [58]

The Supreme Court has noted time and again that although the First Amendment guarantees individuals and groups the right to deliver their message, it does not guarantee any right to deliver that message in the most effective manner possible. [59] It does not guarantee media attention. Nor does it guarantee circumstances that will attract the largest number Of demonstrators. [60] Appellants' concerns in this case are not limited to a fear that their message, purely in terms of its content, will be diluted. They fear at least as much that the effect of their message, however well expressed, will be diminished.

Of course, we must not make the "category mistake" noted above in conjunction with the substantial interest test. Just as the substantiality of the government's interest must be judged by the effect of the law on all persons, so, too, the extent to which it infringes upon speech must be judged by the effect of the law on all persons, and not just by its effect on the appellant. However, the conjunction of the facilitative and expressive aspects of camping in this case is likely to be paralleled in all other First Amendment camping cases. The convenience of the demonstrators and the media value of their message will rival in importance the First Amendment aspects of the camping and thereby further diminish the claim that their First Amendment interest is substantial relative to the government's interest in preventing camping generally.

Judge Edwards correctly notes that "a message is not less deserving of First Amendment protection merely because the manner used to express it serves other


[55 However, as we shall see, pp. 620-622, it would be impossible to fashion "narrow, objective, and definite" standards that would limit permission to camp to those few cases where camping is expressive.]

[56 Letter from CCNV to Park Service (undated), reprinted in RD 5.]

[57 Appellants' Emergency Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal at 21-22; Appellants' Reply Brief at 6-7.]

[58 See Appellants' Emergency Motion for In junction Pending Appeal at 21-22; Appellants' Reply Brief at 7.]

[59 See, e.g., Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consc., 452 U.S. 640, 647, 101 S.Ct. 2559, 2564, 69 L.Ed.2d 298 (1981); Adderly v. Rorida, 385 U.S. 39, 4748, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247-248, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567, 92 S.Ct 2219, 2228, 33 L.Ed.2d 131(1972).]

[60 What the litigant's press agent seeks and what the public interest requires differ widely. Although every man is entitled to make his remonstrance, no man is entitled to make such a remonstrance that it will be carried on all three television networks. Vietnam Veterans Against the War v. Morton. 506 F.2d 53, 58 (D.C.Cir.1974).]

619

needs of the demonstrators." [61] But where there are plenty of alternative ways to express the same message--ways which, though less convenient to the demonstrators, are not fraught with the same harms to legitimate governmental interests--the First Amendment does not extend special protection to the means chosen by the demonstrators, especially where those means are chosen as much for convenience as for expressive value. To repeat, the First Amendment does not guarantee any right to deliver a message in the most effective manner possible. Nor does it guarantee any right to deliver a message in the most convenient way possible. In sum, the substantiality of the government's interest in preventing camping generally in the Memorial core area parks appears to counterbalance the occasional, incidental infringement on speech caused by the regulations.

3. Less Restrictive Alternative

It is important to recognize that appellants wish to conduct their demonstration in a park, a forum traditionally open to the public "for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens." [62] Modes of Fint Amendment activity, such as leafletting and demonstrating, which can be banned from certain locations, such as courthouses [63] jails, [64] and private shopping centers,[65] cannot be abridged or denied in traditional public forums such as the streets [66] and parks. [67] The right to speak in a public forum may be regulated in the interest of all, "but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied." [68]

Appellants argue, relying on this notion that the park is a public forum, that the government must permit exceptions to its ban on camping where the camping is an integral part of First Amendment expression. In other words, appellants argue that the mere fact that the ban is neutral and supported by a substantial governmental interest is insufficient. Some affirmative accommodation of First Amendment interests is necessary in a public forum.

The total ban on "camping" sweeps within its purview First Amendment activities that pose no danger to the alleged governmental interest. Prohibition of peaceful sleeping inside lawfully erected tents as part of a demonstration serves no purpose other than to impermissibly suppress free expression. [69]

Anatole France once said: "The law in its majestic equality forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." [70] The sarcasm is salutory. Appellants are among the most helpless members of our society. They are likely to be uneducated and inarticulate. If it were possible to accommodate their most effective mode of expression without exposing the parks to the harms anticipated by the regulation, then the First Amendment might well reguire that accommodation. The crucial and dispositive aspect of this case is that there is no possibility of a constitutional]y acceptable less restrictive alternative. The Park


[61 Edwards op. at 602-603.]

[62 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S.Ct. 954, 963. 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939) (Roberts, J., concurring).]

[63 See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965).]

[64 See, e.g., Adderly v. Rorida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966).]

[65 See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 92 S.Ct. 2219, 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972).]

[66 See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939).]

[67 See, e.g., Niemotko v. Maryland. 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325, 95 L.Ed 267(1951); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148. 92 L.Ed. 1574 (1948).]

[68 Hague v. CI0,307 U.S. at 516, 59 S.Ct at 964.]

[69 Appellants' Reply Brief at 63.]

[70 A. FRANCE, LE LYS ROUCE (1894) Ch. 7.]

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Service must either allow all camping or abide by a flat-out ban. Any intermediate position designed to accommodate "First Amendment camping" would run afoul of the proscriptions against discretionary screening contained in a long line of Supreme Court cases. [71] The Supreme Court has, in effect, endorsed Anatole France's "majestic equality" as applied to free speech because only totally objective standards will suffice in this area, whatever differentiations there may be in welfare policies.

The teaching of this line of cases is that licensing regulations, to pass constitutional scrutiny, must contain "narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority," [72] and thereby protect against arbitrary action or de facto censorship of certain points of view. It is just such standards that would be impossible to formulate if the court tried to carve a First Amendment exception out of the ban on camping. First Amendment standards cannot themselves be used to state an exception to a neutral regulation of conduct.

The force of this point can be seen by considering the following three examples, asking in each instance whether the Park Service would have to grant a permit to camp under a judicially mandated First Amendment exception to the ban on camping.

(1) A group of tourists comes to D.C. during the summer. Rather than pay to stay in a hotel, they apply for a permit to camp on the Mall "to dramatize and protest against the high cost of hotels." At oral argument appellants stated that this would be a "frivolous case." We agree. But according to what standard is the Park Service to deny the permit? The Park Service cannot be permitted to discriminate between applicants based on the supposed substantiality of their message. That would be content screening in its most blatant form. "[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that the government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. [73] Nor could the Park Service screen applicants on the basis of their sincerity, their commitment to the message they are trying to convey. It is not for the Park Service to decide who really believes that high hotel prices are harmful to the republic and should be regulated by government and who just wants a free place to sleep.

The problem stems from the fact, noted above, that many people, without any First Amendment purpose, would like to camp. The benefits of camping in a convenient location on the Mall will provide them with an incentive to offer a First Amendment pretext for the camping. On the other hand, few would go to the trouble of erecting a temporary structure on the Mall or maintaining a wakeful 24-hour vigil unless they wanted to express something thereby, however inane or frivolous. There could be little other reason for erecting such structures or maintaining such a vigil. Thus, the question of sincerity doesn't arise, and, consequently, the Park Service need not distinguish between substantial and frivolous messages. Applicants for a permit are left to determine for themselves whether their message is "significant" enough to be worth the trouble.

Where camping is concerned the problem of pretextual or frivolous speech is much more important. Presumably, there are a great many people who would like to camp on the Mall or in Lafayette Park, at least during the summer, and would do so if permitted. If we force the Park Service to


[71 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-153, 89 S.Ct 935, 93~940. 22 L.Ed.2d 162(1969); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327-328, 95 L.Ed. 267(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294, 71 S.Ct. 312, 315, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin. 303 U.S. 444. 450-51, 58 S.Ct 666, 668-669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938).]

[72 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. at 151, 89 S.Ct. at 938.]

[73 Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2289, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466-67. 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2293-2294, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980).]

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open the gate for this group because of their sincerity and the substantiality of their message, we will force the Park Service either to screen applicants on that basis or to permit anyone to camp who is willing to offer a First Amendment rationalization, however ludicrous or improbable.

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