THOMAS v. REAGAN
USDC Cr. No. 84-3552
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
WILLIAM THOMAS, et al
Plaintiff Pro Se
versus CA 84-3552
Judge Louis Oberdorfer
UNITED STATES, et al
Defendants
PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO THE MAGISTRATE'S
RECOMMENDATION ON THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT CANFIELD FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs take issue with both the factual accuracy and the
logic of the Magistrate's Recommendation as to Michael Canfield
(Magistrate's Canfield Memo).
A. Magistrate Burnett wrote:
"The Magistrate heard oral argument (on defendants'
Motions for Summary Judgment) on November 15, 1986....[1] The
Magistrate has since carefully considered defendant's motion for
summary judgment..." (Magistrate's Canfield Memo, page 3).
"(T)he gravemen (sic) of plaintiff's complaint and theory of
liability as to Captain Canfield is that he acted individually and
in conspiracy, as part of a `joint venture' with the federal
defendants to violate his First, Fourth, [Fifth, Ninth] and
Fourteenth Amendment rights in initiating criminal prosecution
against him maliciously and without probable cause for the purpose
of interfering with his demonstration activities on the White House
sidewalk." (Ibid. [parentheses added].)
Lest we forget (see Amended Complaint, para 1, see also,
Restatement of Claim, filed August 21, 1986, para. 4 - 6), the
actual gravamen of this controversy is plaintiffs':
"allegation that official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution....
[1 Actually the hearing was held on November 14, 1986 (Docket
Number 292).]
(G)overnments, like every other Section 1983 `person,' by the
very terms of the statute, may be sued for constitutional
deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though
such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's
official decision making channels. As Mr. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, said in Adickes v. Kress & Co, 398 U. 144, 167-168
(1970): `Congress included customs and usage (in Section 1983)
because of the persistent and widespread discriminatory practices
of ... officials.... Although notauthorized by written law, such
practices of ... officials could well be so permanent and well
settled as to constitute a "custom or usage" with the force of
law.'" (Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 430 U.S.
690, 691.)
B. In the Magistrate's view:
"...there are no genuine issues of Material Fact in dispute
which would warrant a trial." (Ibid., page 2.)
For the Court's convenience plaintiffs recite here several
bits of undisputed documented evidence from which, they believe,
reasonable inferences may be drawn:
l. At least as early as March 9, 1983, defendant Canfield
admits, he had been informed by an unidentified agent of the Secret
Service:
"that it was their intent to have (Thomas) move his structures
from the White House sidewalk." (Deposition of Michael Canfield,
July 10, 1986, Docket Number ___.)
2. RICHARD ROBBINS: "(On March 11, 1983) I had accompanied the
United States Park Police to the White House sidewalk to ask the
individuals who had those large ... signs on the White House
sidewalk to remove them, and we were there to prepare for an arrest
situation should they fail to comply with that request." (Tr. Ex.
71, Robbins testimony December 13, 1983, ERA v. Watt, at 51.)
3. CHRISTOPHER MERILLAT: "(On March 11, 1983) I was in concert
with Captain Canfield of the Second District of the Metropolitian
Police Department at which time Mr. Canfield was trying to get the
General Counsel from the District of Columbia to authorize him to
remove the structure to abate the nuisance.... It was approximately
one hour, maybe one hour and fifteen minutes before Mr. Canfield
received approval from General Counsel to have the structures
removed, and to abate the nuisance." (Tr. Ex. 66, testimony of Lt.
Merillat, May 19, 1983, USA v. Thomas, CR 83-056, see also
Plaintiff's Canfield Opposition Memo, page 4, para. 12.)
4. Prior to this litigation defendant Canfield claimed:
"(On March 11, 1983) I actually was in support of the United
States Park Police. It was their territory." (Grand Jury testimony
of Canfield, April 8, 1983, page 4.)
5. (By Lt. Merillat) "....I directed (Thomas) that Captain
Canfield would be discussing something with him, reference to
abating a nuisance.... At that time, Captain Canfield opened the
curtain himself, directing Mr. Thomas to abate the nuisance or he
would be subject to arrest." (Tr. EX 68, USA v. Thomas, Cr 83-056,
May 19, 1983 testimony of Merillat, transcript at 51.)
6. "On March 11, 1983, officers of the U.S. Park Police loaded a
sign onto a National Park Service truck. I begged various
officers, particularly Lt. Merillat, not to confiscate the sign
which was used by my friend, Thomas, and me jointly in the course
of our demonstration activities." (Tr. Ex. 76(a), Affidavit of
Concepcion Picciotto, filed January 17, 1986; see also Tr. Ex.
76(b), testimony of Merillat, CR 83-056, May 19, 1983, at page 73.)
XXX. Beginning from the valid premise that "(a) `joint
venture' can be either lawful or unlawful" (Magistrate's Canfield
Memo at 10 footnote 9/), the Magistrate apparently goes on to
ignore the undisputed fact that, on March 11, 1983, no regulation
existed which provided that signs on the White House sidewalk
should be limited to "hand-held." (Compare, Tr. Ex. 75, see also
Plaintiff's Canfield Opposition Memo, page 4, para. 11.)
1. Plaintiff agrees that it is lawful for defendant Canfield
to enforce regulations of the District of Columbia.
Just the same, civil conspiracy is:
"to participate in an unlawful act, or a lawful act in an unlawful
manner." (See, e.g. Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004,
1012.)
2. The Secret Service kept Interior Department and Park
Police officials informed:
"From the very beginning, when those signs began to be
left, unattended and attended ... we started to have a concern. We
met with individuals and legal people from Interior and Park Police
to work out some kind of arrangement.
( ...)
"I don't remember exactly when I first saw them out there,
physically, but it became apparent that this was going to be a wave
of the future." (Tr. Ex. 25{A} and 25{B}, Testimony of Jerry Parr,
May 3, 1983, USDC CA 83-1243; ERA v. Watt,746 F2d 1518, Compare,
Tr. Ex. 26 testimony of Patricia Bangert, November 30, 1983
[ibid].) [2]
[2 ART SPITZER (counsel for plaintiff ERA): "When you say the
large sign such as then was occurring on the White House sidewalk,
are you referring to a large wooden object that might be described
as a sign or a structure that was used by a person named William
Thomas in his demonstration that had wheels on the bottom and a
sloped front and triangular wooden sides?"
ROBBINS: "Art, I think that came later. What was occurring
up there was a large four foot by eight foot sheets of plywood with
writings on them, and there were several demonstrators, both
individuals and collectively, using generally more than a dozen of
those plywood signs, and sometimes substantially more than a
dozen...." (Tr. Ex. 92, Deposition of Richard Robbins, ERA v. Watt,
November 30, 1983 at 63.)]
3. It is evident that defendants didn't like "signs" even
before "signs" were defined as "structures."
"As you know, we are not in complete agreement concerning
the presence of large, display board type signs on the White House
sidewalk." (Tr. Ex. 57, Jerry Parr letter to Richard Robbins,
January 10, 1983,See Plaintiff's Memorandum Of Points And
Authorities In Opposition To The Motion Of Michael Canfield For
Summary Judgment [Opposition to Canfield Summary Judgment], filed
9/22/86, para. 1.)
4. The Secretary of the Interior became involved:
"I would like a briefing on the regulations that allow
demonstrations and protesters in Lafayette Park and in front of the
White House on Pennsylvania Avenue.
"My intention is to prohibit such activity and require that
they take place on the Ellipse." (Tr. Ex. 58, Memo from James G.
Watt, January 13, 1983, See Opposition to Canfield Summary
Judgment, para. 2.)
5. Defendants knew, or should have known plaintiffs right to
display large signs was well-established:
"(T)he problem ... is that for ten years Court decisions have
held that structures must be allowed at demonstrations." Defendant
Bangert added that other Court decisions have ordered the
government to permit demonstrations on a 24-hour basis ... " (Defendant Bangert
quoted in the New York Times, September 7, 1984, See Federal
Defendants Answer, filed July 31, 1986, para 73).
6. Defendants were undeterred by well-established rights:
"Ms. Concepcion and Mr. Dorrough were directed to remove
the signs, which they did, Mr. Thomas was directed 'don't bring
them back'." (Tr. Ex. 74, testimony of Lt. Merillat, USA v.
Thomas, CR 83-056, May 19, 1983 at 75.)
7. CANFIELD: "I was summoned down there by the officials of
the Uniformed Secret Service and by members of the United States
Park Police to address a problem they were encountering with a
protester... and the Park Police apparently with the permission of
the Solicitor General of the United States had determined that this
... was not a placard or a sign.
"Their intentions were to inform him to abate the
nuisance and move it off federal property. That's how I became
involved in it." (Tr Ex. 65, Page 66 from defendant Canfield's
deposition of July 10, 1986, quoting his Grand Jury testimony,
April 8, 1983, pages 2 and 3; see Plaintiffs' Third Motion to
Supplement Trial Exhibits, filed this date.) [3]
[3 Although defendant Canfield's testimony to the Grand Jury on
April 8, 1983 is cited in Magistrate's Canfield Memo at 2 and 3,
the Magistrate deleted the reference which explained how defendant
Canfield "became involved in it." Additionally the Magistrate
incorrectly identifies the quote as being from "the December 6,
1985 deposition of Captain Canfield."]
8. Without taking the events of March 11, 1983 into
consideration U.S. District Court Judge William P. Bryant found:
"When Assistant Solicitor Robbins spoke to Secretary Watt
about development of the regulations (on or about March 9, 1983),
the Secretary told Mr. Robbins to `keep up the good work.` There
was also contact with the White House to inform White House
counsel of the status of the regulations. "Additionally
plaintiffs urge that the key fact that both versions of the
regulations just happened to proscribe all of the plaintiffs' then
current activities on the sidewalk cannot be regarded as mere
co-incidence.
"In the circumstances it would appear that plaintiff's claim
in this regard can in no wise be characterized as frivolous;
HOWEVER IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE, IT
NEED NOT RESOLVE THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE." (Tr. Ex. 96, Memorandum
Opinion, ERA v. Watt, CA 83-1243 at pages 14 and 15, EMPHASIS
ADDED, (parenthesis added).)
The doctrine of stare decisis demands that Judge Bryant
should be considered a "reasonable fact-finder." Therefore this
Court may perceive the Magistrate's Recommendation to be based on
a demonstrably invalid postulate of "insubstantial evidence." [4]
[4 See, Plaintiffs' Trial Brief (Tr. Br.) and Trial Exhibits (Tr.
Ex), Docket Number 249, Opposition By Plaintiffs To Defendant
Canfield's Motion For Summary Judgment; with Points and
Authorities, Docket Number 239; Opposition By Plaintiffs To
Federal Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Docket Number 241;
all filed September 22, 1986; Plaintiffs' Genuine Issues In Dispute
With Defendant Lindsey, with Memo In Support, Docket Number 208,
filed August 27, 1986; Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion
for Protective Order, filed August 11, 1986.]
9. In addition to Judge Bryant's observations, plaintiffs have
set forth and documented [5] a series of events from which a
reasonable fact-finder might readily infer that this defendant
conspired with others in a discernable effort to deprive plaintiffs
(William Thomas, et. al.) of their rights.
[5 "(P)laintiff would direct the Court's attention to the fact
that throughout these proceedings he has filed various documents as
attachments to his pleadings. Plaintiff asks the Court to take
Judicial Notice of those documents, and to direct counsel for
defendants to note any objection they may have to those documents
as evidentiarymaterial in this matter." (Plaintiff's Motion for
Judicial Notice, filed August 27, 1986, at page 3, para. 3.
UNOPPOSED BY FEDERAL DEFENDANTS, denied by the Magistrate)]
10. There is ample evidence presented in this case which no
fact-finder has had an opportunity to consider. [6]
[6 e.g. Plaintiff has pointed out in previous filings that a
photographer, by arrangement of the Park Police, was present at the
scene of the March 11, 1983 incidents, and that he took well over
ninety (90) photographs (see e.g. Tr. Ex. 56, and Original
Complaint, filed November 21, 1984, pages 36-41). No fact-finder
has considered the series of events depicted in those photographs.
(see Reply to Deft. Canfield's Answer to the Amended Complaint,
filed January 6, 1986, Docket Number 98).]
Case Listing --- Proposition One ---- Peace Park