Plaintiffs' whole point is that they have a "right" to
continue maintaining the "continuous presence" which they have
been maintaining since 1981, AND that is what they were doing at
[2 See, e.g., "At the outset of the January 6th hearing William
Thomas, who spoke on behalf of all Plaintiffs, stated that
Plaintiffs were not challenging the validity of the regulations
at issue, but only the manner in which they were being enforced."
Proposed Order to Dismiss for Frivolity, January 11, 1995, pg 3.]
3
all times at issue in this complaint. E.g., Motion to Reschedule
Preliminary Injunction Hearing, "Identity Crisis," pg. 4, etc. [3]
Also, regardless of allegations concerning the "camping"
regulation, threatening and assaulting people or property are
self-evidently grounds for legal action. Pounding on the sign
qualifies.
3. Plaintiffs' biggest problem is that the Court has
apparently re-written the complaint to state a claim which
plaintiffs would not have attempted to bring. Plaintiffs believe
it is an error for the Court to pare the complaint to a theory of
action which plaintiffs consider frivolous.
- "(T)he District Court must look to the way the
complaint is drawn to ... claim a right to recover under the
Constitution and the laws of the United States." Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 681 (1945).
This complaint was brought under the theory evolved under
the Civil Rights Act of 42 USC 1983 et. seq. In plaintiffs'
opinion the Court has redrafted the complaint along the lines of
an Administrative Procedures Act complaint, thus limiting inquiry
to such a narrow scope that proving a violation of 42 USC is
rendered impossible.
3. The Court held:
[3 "The term 'demonstrations' includes ... holding vigils or
religious services and all other like forms of conduct which
involve the communication or expression of views or grievances,
engaged in by one or more persons, the conduct of which has the
effect, intent, or propensity to draw a crowd or onlookers...."
36 CFR 7.96 (g)(1)(i).
In fact, as recently as March 5, 1985 defendant Robbins
explicitly claimed that the Park Service had no desire to
preclude "continuous vigils" from Lafayette Park. Federal
Register, Vol. 51 No. 43, pg. 7559, 2nd col., March 5, 1985, for
Mr. Robbins' name see, id. 7556, 2nd col.]
4
- "Plaintiffs allege that Officers O'Neill and Keness often
threatened to arrest the Plaintiffs for unlawfully camping
in the Park. The Officers also allegedly kicked the
Plaintiffs, prodded them with nightsticks, and banged on the
Plaintiffs' signs." (Memo p. 4; also at p. 11 and p. 16.)
Nowhere does the Complaint allege that any officers kicked
or prodded the plaintiffs. The officers kicked and prodded
others similarly situated to plaintiffs, and banged on the
plaintiffs' signs with no probable cause for any threat. The
issue at hand is the officers' malicious conduct, not plaintiffs'
guilt or innocence. This is not a criminal trial, and plaintiffs
are not defendants. This was clearly stated in the Complaint and
Amended Complaint.
4. The Court held,
- "First, Plaintiffs have failed to indicate with
sufficient specificity to what extent Defendant Robbins was
responsible for supervising the wrongdoers... The Complaint
does not charge that Robbins was responsible for training or
overseeing Officers O'Neill and Keness." (Memo p. 9-10.)
Plaintiffs believe that the Court has misplaced the burden.
Plaintiffs have "alleged" Mr. Robbins' had "supervisory
responsibility." E.g., Amended Complaint, Count 6. Since the
allegations must be "taken as true," they have met that burden.
Although they feel they have met the requisite pleading
standards, [4] plaintiffs submit U.S. Park Police Operations
Division Memorandum No. 14 (December 6, 1982) which states:
"The enforcement of these regulations in which the activity
may be a part of a First Amendment expression should be
delayed until consultation with a supervisor and a
[4 If Mr. Robbins didn't have "responsibility," in light of the allegations, defendants have the burden of establishing that he doesn't have the alleged responsibility.]
5
representative of the Solicitor's Office...."
5. The Court held,
- "Plaintiffs have failed to plead with specificity how
Defendant Robbins acted with gross negligence." Memo, pg.
10.
Perhaps the Court has overlooked the fact that among
plaintiffs' jurisdictional authorities are §§ 42 USC 1985(3) and
1986.
- "For purposes of (42 USC 1985(3)), a defendant is personally
involved in the acts of his subordinates if he had knowledge
of conduct, and consented to it; he need not have taken
part." Alvarez v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 137.
6. The Court has not ruled on Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike
Randolph Myers' letter. Filed February 6, 1995. Mr. Myers'
letter "responds to (plaintiffs') letter to Richard Robbins dated
November 10, 1994," and accused plaintiffs of having illegal
flags.
7. The Court apparently also overlooked Plaintiffs' Notice
to the Court (February 23, 1995) in response to Mr. Robbins'
letter of February 23, 1995, which threatened plaintiffs with
"appropriate law enforcement action by the United States Park
Police."
8. The Court held,
- "The Plaintiff has not provided factually specific
allegations that Officer O'Neill acted without probable
cause to arrest the Plaintiff (for disorderly conduct) (Memo
p. 13) ... nor have the Plaintiffs claimed that Officer
O'Neill acted in bad faith." (Memo p. 14)
Plaintiffs respectfully disagree, and suggest that the Court
has either (1) decided the issue for Officer O'Neill, by viewing
the facts in a light most favorable to him, or (2) essentially
holds that an officer cannot be held accountable for an unlawful
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"disorderly conduct" arrest under any circumstances.
- "(T)he threats to enforce the statutes against appellants
are not made with any expectation of securing valid
convictions, but rather are part of a plan to employ
arrests, and threats of prosecution under color of the
statutes, to harass appellants and discourage them and their
supporters from asserting and attempting to vindicate ...
constitutional rights...." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
482 (1965(.
9. The Court held,
- "(As the Plaintiffs concede, 36 CFR 7.96(g)(5)(x)(B)
prohibits the use of signs in the Park with several limited
exceptions. It also prohibits the erection of 'structures'
in the Park, including props and displays. 36 CFR
796.(g)(5)(x)(A)(4). The Plaintiffs have not asserted that
their sign did not fall within either of these statutory
bans." (Memo p. 14-15.)
Here the Court is simply mistaken. Plaintiffs have
repeatedly claimed that their signs were within the limits (e.g.,
Complaint, Exhibit 3, Letter to Robbins, November 10, 1994).
"The lack of regulatory authority upon which the
Officers could rely regarding the flags renders this factual
allegation quite distinct from the other four." Memo, pg.
20, n. 7.
Moreover, plaintiffs have repeatedly claimed that the
officers lacked regulatory authority to threaten plaintiffs for
having the base of their sign "raised above the ground" (e.g.,
Motion to Reschedule Preliminary Injunction Hearing,, pg. 3, n.
2, see also, Motion for Sanctions, pgs. 17-18).
10. The Court held,
- "Plaintiff has not alleged that the cooler related in any
way to her First Amendment expressive activities, nor can
the Court divine any other right implicated in this regard."
(Memo p. 15.)
The error here is that the Court has taken the "cooler
allegation" out of context.
"(T)he character and effect of a conspiracy are not to be
7
judged by dismembering it and viewing its separate parts,
but only by looking at it as a whole." 16 Am. Jur. Second
Edition, Section II.
11. If plaintiffs have overcome the heightened pleading
standard in any respect, money damages are appropriate.
- "The Court finds that the Defendants' assertion in
their Motion that all claims against the three individual
Defendants must be dismissed if the Defendants prevail upon
the arguments raised in their Motion is incorrect. If the
Court finds the Defendants' positions persuasive, the
Defendants Richard Robbins, Stephen O'Neill, and Andrew
Keness will be relieved from liability for damages, but
cannot be dismissed as Defendants with respect to the
Plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive action by
this Court." (Memo, p. 6.)
CONCLUSION
We hope the court will reconsider, and permit the complaint
to go forward as plaintiffs initially framed it.
Respectfully submitted this 19th day of April, 1995.
______________________
William Thomas
2817 11th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-462-0757
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby state that, on April 19, 1995, I delivered copy of
the foregoing Plaintiff' Motion PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT'S APRIL 12, 1995 ORDER upon the
office of the United States Attorney, 555 4th Street NW,
Washington, D.C. ROOM 10-808, by HAND DELIVERY.
8